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Profits, Welfare, and Class Position:
1965-1984
MARcus D. POHLMANN
Rhodes College
Department of Political Science

The study utilizes an extended version of a Charles V Hamilton paradigm in order to estimate yearly income transfers between classes in
America's system of "welfare state capitalism." Analyzing the period
from 1965 to 1984, what becomes most obvious is the substantial annual transfer from the middle/working class to the owning class. The
transfer rose to more than $150 billion by 1984-a full 10% of middle/
working class income. Yet when looking at the implications, an interesting paradox emerges. Although the amount of transfer has increased
some over the period, it has not grown nearly as fast as the after-tax
income gap between the two classes. Those at the top have gotten
sizably richer,while those beneath them have actually been witnessing
a real-dollar income decline. Ultimately, this is attributed to both a
postindustrial income bimodality within the non-elite population as
well as a redistribution downward within that group. Frustratedby
their own declining economic status, however, middle Americans at
least temporarily turn a good bit of their wrath towards welfare recipients and not the owners of capital-much as Hamilton predicted.

This study concludes that the rich are getting richer and the
poor poorer in the United States. That will come as no real
surprise to the more than three-quarters of the American public
who are already convinced of that (Harris, 1983). The study also
concludes that the average American pays a sizable share of his
or her paycheck to government each year and is not pleased
about having that hard-earned money go to many of the present
welfare recipients. What is somewhat less obvious, though, is
that a significant portion of those paychecks also goes to the
owners of corporate capital-as a sort of "tribute" for the privilege of living in the country they own; and, government, welfare recipients, and this owning dass interrelate to create that
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reality. The documentation and explanation of how that happens
are the primary foci of this study.
By utilizing an extended version of the "conduit colonialism"
model first developed by Charles V. Hamilton (1972), the study
attempts to provide a relatively unique perspective on the functioning of America's liberal-capitalist political economy. But
where Hamilton focused on the systemic functions of the poor
as welfare recipients, this study extends his model to focus on
the systemic functions of the middle/working class as well. What
is found is that the owning class is enriched at the expense of
the middle/working and lower classes. This runs directly contrary to the prevalent contemporary notion that if the rich are
allowed to get richer, most everybody else will benefit by virtue
of a "trickle down" effect.
The primary goal is to estimate yearly income transfers between classes over the period from 1965 to 1984. Analyzing the
functioning of the American political economy during that period has a number of advantages. For example, those living in
"poverty" were not regularly singled out for systematic study by
the Census Bureau prior to 1965. In addition, the period encompasses both economic slumps and booms as well as significant
variations in governmental taxing and spending orientations.
Before beginning, however, three more methodological notes are
in order.
First, the operation of the economic system is a dynamic
process. Corporate profits, for example, generally are not hoarded
away in the vaults of the owning class. Instead, they are often
spun back into the economy in the form of investments, bonuses, and the like. What this study provides, on the other hand,
is a year-end snapshot of this process; and when viewed over
time, these year-end snapshots should provide a reasonable indication of which class groupings have been gaining and which
have been losing in the course of this dynamic arrangement.
Secondly, some of the operational definitions have been dictated by data availability, e.g., the "owning class" will be operationally defined as the top 5% of American families in terms
of income; although for a measure of their wealth, an estimate
of the wealth held by the top 5% of adults has been used. In
actuality, the author would have preferred to use the top 1% of
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wealthholders for both operationalizations, but there was simply
not enough parallel data available over time.
Lastly, some of the developments are analyzed over slightly
different time periods, e.g., wealth concentrations are only
measured through 1982, and not 1984, because the most recent
comparable data were available for those periods.
Such is the crudity often involved in working with others'
data. Nevertheless, this study should provide some empirical
guideposts.
The Conceptual Model
Government
At least in domestic policy-making, it can be argued that
government (meaning federal, state, and local levels combined),
has come to play three basic roles: allocation, stabilization, and
redistribution. Allocation is the provision of maintenancce, or
"housekeeping," services. These include police and fire protection, educating the young, keeping the streets and highways
paved, and so on. Stabilization involves government using fiscal
and monetary policies to help maintain a healthy, growing economy. If successful, these actions will have helped secure adequate numbers of jobs, goods, and services for an ever-increasing
American population. Lastly, through redistribution, government attempts to compensate those who suffer significant economic hardship in the course of this process. It does so by using
tax revenues to provide assistance in such forms as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and unemployment
compensation.
Owning Class (Hamilton's "Welfare Beneficiaries")
These are the people who assume the chore of accumulating
the bulk of the nation's wealth; and in the process, it is hoped
that they will create relatively stable patterns of capital investment. Their discretion in the latter regard adds considerable
economic and political power to the personal and familial security their wealth provides (Pohlmann, 1986, pp. 150-285).
As operationalized in this study, this group is defined as the
top 5% of American families in terms of income, which in 1984
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had incomes exceeding $73,200. Each of these families generally
had assets of at least $200,000, stock valued in excess of $50,000,
and received more than one quarter of their incomes from business investments. As a group, they have consistently owned
nearly two-thirds of the nation's stock or more (IRS, 1929-1986;
New York Times, 1986; Edwards, 1978, p. 306; Smith and Franklin, 1974).
Besides wages, gifts, and inheritance, their income is derived
from at least three other sources: the exploitation of employees,
as well as direct and indirect governmental aid. The exploitation
of employees involves making profits from investments of their
capital by charging more for products and services than employees are paid to produce and distribute them (Marx, 1935).
Direct governmental aid includes government subsidies like low
interest loans and tax abatements, besides profits derived from
contracts with government for building highways, bombers,
housing, and so on. Indirect governmental aid is the profit attained when selling goods and services to the publicly subsidized indigent, persons who will be called "welfare recipients"
from here on.
Welfare Recipients
For the purposes of this study, this group has been operationally defined as the bottom 20% of American families in
terms of income, those who have generally been eligible to receive one or more forms of "public assistance" from the Welfare
State. Their 1984 incomes were less than $12,489 and they owned
virtually no assets whatsoever (IRS).
Middle/Working Class (MC/WC) Work Force and Tax Base
These people, the remaining 75% of American families whose
incomes fall between $12,489 and $73,200, also find themselves
caught in an economic predicament. They work in either the
private or public sector to produce the nation's goods and services. Most are employees of the owning class, working for a
wage that is less than the market value of what they produce.
In addition, taxation deprives them of a significant portion of
their incomes, while billions of dollars of their tax payments end
up in the hands of the owning class.
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What is left for those who work for a living? If, for example,
the 1977 average tax rate is applied to the 1977 median family
income, that typical family was left with $9,380 at a time when
the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that it would cost such
a family $11,367 to meet an "intermediate budget" for food, shelter, clothing, transportation, and personal and medical care (Information, 1979, p. 60; Sherman, 1972, pp. 50-51). And without
a cushion of wealth to fall back on if times get significantly
worse, these middle/working class people find themselves quite
economically vulnerable. A five-year University of Michigan
study, for example, concluded that seven out of ten American
families have at least an even chance of spending some years of
their lives in "economic distress," most likely the result of a
family losing the paycheck of one of its breadwinners (New York
Times, 1977b; Levison, 1974; Shostak, 1969). 1
Much of this should become clearer by examining "Welfare
State Capitalism" in the United States. The model contains seven
junctures where money is transferred from one group of participants to another. These have been labelled: private-sector profits, personal taxes, diret subsidies, contract profits, interest
profits, public assistance, and conduit profits. Lastly, there is
the venting of pent-up frustration that is termed "directed wrath."
(Domhoff, 1967; Hamilton, 1972; Harrington, 1984; Piven and
Cloward, 1971; Millband, 1969; O'Connor, 1973; Parenti, 1983).
Welfare State Capitalism
Private-Sector Profits
When the owning class invests its money in corporations it
expects something in return. What it gets in return are profits.
These, as mentioned above, derive from paying the workers less
than the market value of what they have produced. In other
words, this is a return to capital, not to labor.
These corporate profits have accounted for at least 10% of all
national income throughout most of this century. In the period
under study, they rose from 119.7 to 124.4 in billions of constant
1984 dollars, after subtracting the owners' taxes, profits from
transactions with government, and adjustments for inventory
valuation and capital depreciation (See Table 1). There was sig-
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nificant fluctuation over the period, but profits have now reached
their highest level in 20 years and appear to be climbing to new
2
heights .
Personal Taxes
By 1984, Americans were paying nearly $700 billion in taxes
every year. And when looking at this tax burden imposed by
federal, state, and local governments combined, it is quite clear
that the United States does not have a progressive tax system.
In 1980, for example, economist Joseph Pechman (1985, p. 52)
found the poorest one-tenth of American families made 1.3% of
all adjusted family income before taxes, and still had only 1.3%
of it afterwards. While at the other end of the income spectrum,
the wealthiest one-tenth made 33.1% of all adjusted family income before taxes, and had 33.9% of it after all taxes had been
paid.
In 1965, the middle/working class paid some $2597 (1984
dollars) per capita in taxes. That figure grew to a peak of $3528
in 1978, and was still $3178 by 1983-despite a major federal
income tax cut between 1981 and 1983. Thus, as a group, the
middle/working class was paying some $559 billion in taxes by
3
1983.
How government chooses to spend its revenues will be considered next.
Direct Subsidies
Each year the Survey of CurrentBusiness compiles the amount
of governmental subsidies paid to non-governmental enterprises-primarily in the agricultural, construction, and transportation industries. Converted to 1984 dollars, the owning class'
share of those subsidies amounted to $11.8 billion in 1965. That
figure then grew to a peak of $17.5 billion in 1983, and was
4
$16.1 a year later. (See Table 1.)
Contract Profits
The owning class is also reaping after-tax profits from their
business transactions with government, although these profits
declined somewhat between 1965 and 1984. At the beginning
of that period, as the Viet Nam War raged, the after-tax profits
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from sales to government were estimated to be $7.4 billion in
1984 dollars. That figure dropped below $4 billion in the early
1980s but was $4.3 billion in 1984.5 (See Table 1.) Yet, it should
be remembered that these are quite conservative estimates when
considering that many of government's biggest purchases-e.g.,
most of its defense equipment-are made without competitive
bidding from industries within which profit rates are often considerably higher than the average corporate profit rates used in
the calculations for this paper (New York Times, 1985a, 1985b).
Interest Profits
Governmental indebtedness continues to mount, and thus
government continues to pay more and more interest to its lenders. This has meant an increase in real-dollar after-tax profits
for the owning class. From a 1965 figure of $4.5 billion, for example, it is estimated that they have recently begun to make
over $6 billion a year. (See Table 1.) That is a 40% rate of
6
increase.
Public Assistance
Public assistance refers to the host of governmental programs
designed to ease the load of being poor in America, e.g., AFDC,
Medicaid, Food Stamps, Rent Subsidies, and Supplemental Aid
for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled. They provide the poor with
money and vouchers with which they can purchase necessities
of life like food, shelter, clothing, and medical assistance. Beginning primarily with Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and accelerating dramatically during Lyndon Johnson's Great Society
era, such relief payments have grown to quite sizable proportions, e.g., 74 need-based programs provided millions of indigents with over $134 billion worth of "relief" in 1984 (Burke,
1984). The Congressional Research Service refers to these programs as the "welfare system." Yet, this story does not end here,
for the poor do not eat, wear, and live under these checks and
coupons. Instead, they spend them; and in the process, they
provide additional profit for the owning class.
Conduit Capitalism
Charles V. Hamilton (1972) was one of the first to note the
"conduit" function played by most all relief recipients. As in-
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dicated earlier, this occurs when various proportions of their
governmentally funded purchases flow on to the owning classe.g., wealthy landlords, nursing home operators, and the stockholders of pharmaceutical companies-as profits from these
transactions. Although it is much more difficult to determine
which of these vendors is making precisely how much money
by serving the poor, it is possible to estimate what the owning
class vendors as a group have made. For example, applying the
average after-tax corporate profit rates to the billions spent on
need-based public assistance programs, there was nearly a tripling of real dollar vendor profits flowing to the owning class
between 1965 and 1984. The figure had risen to some $1.4 billion
by the latter date. (See Table 1.)7
Summary
America's political-economic system does seem to reinforce
existing class relationships. This becomes even more obvious
when the above figures are compiled. (See Table 1.)
In 1965, the American political economy transferred more
than $143 billion (1984 dollars) from the middle/working class
to the owning class. That amounted to some 14% of the income
of the middle/working class.
Although fluctuating with the owning class' private-sector
profits in the years that followed, the total transfer had risen to
more than $150 billion by 1984-still a full 10% of increased
middle/working class income, translated, that means that the
average American is now working more than one month out of
every year in order to supply increased income to the owning
class.
Government was directly involved in about one-fifth of this
transfer, and it was indirectly involved in the rest by means of
its non-progressive tax system, economic regulations, many of
its maintenance services, and so on.
The Bottom Line
As indicated by Figure 2, the rich are indeed getting richer
by the end of this entire process. For example, the poorest owning class family made $54.961 (1984 dollars) in 1965 and $73,230
by 1984. At the same time, the average American family was
clearly better off than in 1965, but has witnessed a real-dollar
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Table 1
Money Transfers From MiddlelWorking Class to Owning Class,
1965-1984

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

Private
Sector
Corporate
Profits
(after
taxes)
(1)

Government
Subsidies
(2)

119.7
113.0
103.2
96.0
81.3
72.1
74.6
94.0
91.5
61.6
76.8
84.6
101.6
110.6
104.4
80.1
83.2
74.2
101.6
124.4

11.8
13.0
10.5
10.4
10.7
11.1
10.8
15.1
12.6
6.7
6.4
6.4
8.2
9.7
9.3
9.5
10.2
12.7
17.5
16.1

Government
Contract
Profits
(after
taxes)
(3)

Government
Debt
Interest
Profits
(after
taxes)
(4)

7.4
7.3

4.5
4.4

7.6

4.6

7.0
5.5

4.5
4.9

4.4
4.6

5.4
6.3

5.5

6.6

4.6

5.3

2.7

4.4

3.9
3.8
4.6

4.6
4.1
4.5

4.7

4.5

4.0
3.0

4.3
4.0

3.5

3.9

3.4
3.8
4.3

4.5
5.3
6.3*

Conduit
Profits
(after
taxes)

Total
MC/WC
"Tribute"
Paid

% of
MC/WC
Income

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.5*
0.8*
1.0*
1.1
1.0*
1.2*
1.2*
1.5*
1.3
0.9*
1.3
1.4
1.7
1.8
1.5
1.1
1.3
1.2
1.3
1.4

143.9
138.5
126.9
119.0
103.4
94.2
97.5
122.7
115.3
76.3
93.0
100.3
120.6
131.3
123.5
97.7
102.1
96.0
129.5
152.5

14
13
12
10
9
8
8
9
8
6
7
7
9
9
8
7
7
7
9
10

All money figures in constant (1984) billions of dollars.
All data are the most recent estimates available in government documents
below.
:extrapolation
Sources: Survey of Current Business, Statistical Abstracts of the United States,
and Congressional Research Service Report 85-194 (1984).
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income loss of more than $1000 since the late 1970s. Lastly,
lower-class families saw their average real-dollar income increase between 1965 and 1973 as the Great Society welfare programs took effect. Nonetheless, those incomes dropped an
average of over $1500 per family between 1973 and 1984.
In terms of corporate stock, it is estimated that the owning
class held more than three-quarters of it in 1965, and still possesses nearly two-thirds of it at very least. 8 As for the rest of the
stock, much of it is owned in relatively small amounts, and the
average dollar value of these share-holdings has shrunk dramatically. For example, the median portfolio was $6,200 in 1985,
less than one-third of what it was a decade earlier; and, it should
be remembered that a growing amount of this investment is
tied up in small tax-sheltered Individual Retirement Accounts,
e.g., approximately $75 billion worth in 1986 (Christian Science
Monitor, 1985; New York Times, 1986).
As for corporate control, Edward S. Greenberg sums it up
this way,
Ironically, the slight disperal that has occurred has probably
enhanced the position of major stockholders, who now require a
lower percentage of voting stock to exercise control in a corporation
than they did in the past. When one considers the coalitions of
large stockholders that in fact occur, the vaunted dispersal of stock
ownership begins to appear less significant (1983, p. 136).
There have been two important parallel phenomena, however. The first is the infusion of foreign capital into the United
States. The second is the growing amount of corporate stock
being purchased out of private pension funds.
Although it is difficult to gather reliable data on the amount
foreign capitalists have invested in this country, the Federal Reserve Board estimated foreign holdings to be 2% of corporate
stock in 1965 and 5% by 1983 (Federal Reserve Board; U.S. News,
1977). This does complicate the Welfare State Capitalism model
a bit. In the end, however, this simply tends to make the estimates more conservative for at least three interrelated reasons.
First, some of the profits garnered by foreigners do not appear
in U.S. governmental statistics on taxable private-sector profits;
and thus the amount of money being extracted from the middle/
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working class is even greater yet. A second point is that these
foreign investments help explain why a smaller share of all domestic corporate stock is presently held by the top 5% of Americans-a fact which has led to reduced profit totals in the
government-assisted transfers calculated above, even though the
additional money is still being extracted from the pockets of the
American middle/working class and flowing to owners of capital. Third, it means that the American owning class holds an
even larger share of corporate stock if one focuses only on that
which is held domestically.
A far more significant development is the fact that greater
than 10% of all corporate stock is now held for the middle/working class by means of their pension fund accounts (Federal Reserve Board, 1984).9 For the individual employee, however, these
are relatively small portfolios, are indirectly held and voted for
them, and such investments are often governed by regulations
which limit the investment discretion of their trustees. Nevertheless, should organizations like the AFL-CIO ever succeed in
politicizing their control over these funds-some $608 billion in
1983 (Federal Reserve Board, 1984), a significant power shift
could be in the offing (Drucker, 1976).
On the other hand, one should be very careful not to interpret the decline in the proportion of stock held by the American
owning class to suggest a decline in their economic well being.
Although they do indeed own less of the nation's stock, their
share of overall national wealth has remained relatively steady
at more than 40% of all national wealth throughout the period
under review. 10 Thus, those in the owning class have simply
been more inclined to choose investments other than stock.
Yet, a paradox is beginning to emerge. The after-tax income
gap between the middle/working and owning classes has continued to widen, whereas the wealth gap has not. But beyond
that, their respective shares of all family income have remained
relatively steady too. The top 5% of American families have
consistently made some 16% of that income, while the middle
three-quarters of the families have been making 79% of it (Census Bureau; IRS). And just as mystifying are the trends apparent
in Figure 3.
The growth in the after-tax income gap is most apparent
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here. First, however, there was some modest levelling in the
latter 1960s during the Great Society period; and, this did seem
to correspond to a decline in tribute payments and can also be
seen in the lessening of the owning class' share of all stock and
general wealth discussed above. Yet, thereafter, these trends reverse until owning class tribute, stock, and wealth reach plateaus of sorts, while the income gap literally soars after the
mid-1970s. But how can the income gap between the classes be
widening, while income and wealth shares and tribute have
remained relatively steady?
Focusing on the relationship between the middle/working
and owning classes, there are at least four viable explanations,
each of which will be discussed below. The first two are essentially mathematical in nature; and although the most obvious,
they simply do not explain one of the crucial phenomena. The
other two have greater potential for explaining that latter phenomenon, but they are more tentative.
By simple mathematics, with the owning class receiving more
than three times its income share over time (5% receiving 16%
of all income), and the middle/working class only slightly more
than their own (75% making 79% of all income), the income gap
is bound to grow as the pie expands. In addition, as the owning
class has received billions of dollars in tribute, the total familyincome pie has expanded in 16 of the 20 years under study, and
each class has maintained its share of that expanded pie. That
would seem to support the trickle-down concept. The owning
class continues to get its disproportionate share and thus grows
relatively richer. Nevertheless, the non-owning classes, by pulling down a steady share of an expanding pie, find an overall
growth in real-dollar income as well. Or do they?
It is at this point that the first explanation falls short. Although it helps explain the real-dollar increase in the gap between middle/working and owning-class incomes, it should be
recalled that the real-dollar income of the middle/working class
has actually been declining. As measured by median family income, it fell by $1,026 real dollars between 1978 and 1984. Consequently, something else must be going on.
A second mathematical approach also appears to hold out
some explanatory hope. It should be remembered that the Wel-

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

fare State Capitalism model revolves around the ownership of
corporate capital. Therefore, as the owning class has come to
own a smaller share of the nation's corporate stock, its share of
private-sector profits have declined, reducing "tribute" as calculated by the model. Nevertheless, the fact that they have shifted
their savings into other forms of wealth does not mean that they
are no longer acquiring income from such investments. As a
matter of fact, one can only assume that they would not have
switched investments if they did not feel that that would be a
financially lucrative move. In the end, then, the owning class
appears to be garnering some of their increased income from
"non-capitalist" investments outside the model used in this study,
e.g., certain personal real estate ventures, or whatever. Yet, that
does not explain the real-dollar decline in middle/working class
income either.
Although more difficult to measure given limitations of
available income data, there are two additional approaches which
offer greater hope for resolving the paradox.
First of all, amidst the shift from an industrial-dominated
to a service-dominated economy, there is mounting evidence
that a bimodality is developing within the middle/working class.
Skilled technicians and professionals continue to do well in the
more highly technological era, while much of the rest of the
work force is slipping into the "secondary labor market" (Pohlmann, 1986, pp. 14-83, 150-230, 333-378).
George Sternleib and James Hughes note the general phenomenon when looking at constant dollar income distributions
between 1973 and 1982. During that period, there was a growth
in the proportion of the population making $35,000, a clear
shrinkage of the $15,000-$35,000 group, and a growth in the
percentage making less than $15,000 (Sternleib and Hughes,
1984).
The growth at the top reflects the increase in managerial and
professional positions integral to an expanding service economy.
But why the loss of income in the rest of the middle/working
class category? Consider the fact that between 1973 and 1982, for
example, the United States lost 1.3 million manufacturing jobs
which paid an average of $17,000 per year, while adding an even
larger number of service positions which paid an average of
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only $12,000 per year. More Americans had come to be employed
by McDonalds than by either General Motors or U.S. Steel. The
unionization rate for the overall workforce had slipped below
20%-and was lower yet if government workers were excluded.
Meanwhile, roughly one-half of all new jobs created between
1976 and 1985 paid a family head poverty-level wages, while the
number of persons without health insurance rose 32% (Sternleib
and Hughes, 1984; New York Times, 1987a, 1987c; Memphis
Commercial Appeal, 1986, 1987).
As further evidence of this intra-class division, the income
share of the second lowest quintile of American families has
fallen by a full 1% since the mid-1970s, while the middle quintile has fallen one-half of 1%. Conversely, the second highest
quintile has increased its share by 0.4%, and the highest quintile by a full 2%-with only one-quarter of that gain accounted
for by the owning class. On the face of it, those figures may
appear rather miniscule; however, they take on added significance given the tremendous consistency of the distribution in
the prior decade. Thus, although the entire group's overall income share remains the same, the majority of the middle/working class may have been losing ground because of the on-going
change in the labor market. Thus, the group's median income
could decline while its overall income and income share remained steady, propped up by the earnings of the top of this
class grouping.
To make matters worse, these figures actually understate the
trend for at least two reasons: (1) the large Baby Boom generation has begun to reach its peak earning years; and (2) the number of multiple-income families has been growing markedly.
Thus, the present does not appear as bad as it has become, and
the future looks even less promising for the next generation of
middle/working class families (Sternleib and Hughes, 1984).
Lastly, as spending on public assistance programs has increased by more than 700% in real dollars since 1965, the bulk
of the middle/working class may well have spent most, if not
more than, their share of the income expansion to help the poorer
20% of American families retain their post-transfer 5% of overall
income. The average owning class family, on the other hand,
would have received enough from their disproportionate share

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

of the increased income so that they could pay their proportion
of the tax bill and still emerge with a sizable increase in income.
Directed Wrath
Tax money is collected from the upper-lower and lower-middle
classes (Black and white)-whom I call the "middies"-and funneled through the conduit system to private hands in another segment of the economy. And all of the while the ignorant,
unsuspecting "middies" think their money is going to help "shiftless, lazy welfare cheats." Both the middies and the conduits are
being pillaged (Hamilton, 1972, pp. 42-43).
As they have watched their own standard of living decline
since the mid-1970s, it should come as no surprise that the middle/working class has become frustrated. It is instructive, however, to note who ended up as a primary target of their wrath.
The words "welfare recipient" seem to conjure up one of two
images in the minds of many middle Americans. The first is the
black female-headed household with numerous small and/or adolescent children, having lived somewhat comfortably on the
dole for years, and probably receiving more aid than it is legally
entitled to receive. The second, even more resented, is the shiftless black male hanging out on the street comer when he could
actually be working.
Yet, there is a considerable difference between public assistance myth and public assistance reality. The modal relief-receiving family is white, with one child under 6 years of age,
and has been on relief less than 1 year. More than 60% have
been on less than 3 years, while only about 15% are truly
chronic-staying with the system for 8 years or more (SAUS,
1986, p. 382; New York Times, 1987b; Marable, 1983; Harrington, 1984).
Focusing on AFDC, the bell-weather of the relief package,
more than 70% of the recipients are children. As for the heads
of these households, only a small minority are deemed to be
"able-bodied" (12% in 1977), and most of these are mothers who
are the sole resident-parents of small children. The number of
able-bodied adult males receiving such relief has been estimated
at 1.5% of the caseload (U.S. News, 1972, p. 57); not a particularly high figure in a period when 5-10% of those actively
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seeking work could not find it. And it has been estimated that
some 90-95% of all recipients are legally eligible, with nearly
half of the ineligibles receiving benefits due to administrative
errors (New York Times, 1977a). The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare actually found less than 3% of AFDC cases
"suspected of fraud" in 1973, 1.6% with "possible questions of
fraud," and 0.8% with "sufficient facts to support" such charges.
Less than 0.2% were ultimately prosecuted (JEC, 1973). Overall,
then, the amount of middle/working class money going to "welfare abusers" is miniscule compared to the amount of their paychecks that are transferred to the owning class in the form of
tribute each year.
Nevertheless, polls conducted during a particularly telling
period reflect the average American's increased animosity toward "welfare." Amidst the real-dollar levelling of the mid-1960s,
such attitudes were relatively favorable. For example, a majority
of Americans felt that spending on "welfare and relief programs"
was either not enough or about right (Gallup, 1964). Yet, once
those programs proliferated and the real-dollar incomes of middle/working class citizens began to decline, this tone changed
considerably. In the latter 1970s, for instance, 58% of Americans
now disapproved of most government-sponsored "welfare" programs; and two out of three respondents mistakenly believed
public assistance costs even made up a major part of their locality's expenditures (New York Times, 1977c, 1978b).
How, then, does one move to counteract these lazy, coniving,
overly promiscuous welfare chiselers? The majority of Californians, for example, cited a desire to reduce "welfare expenditures" as their primary reason for supporting Proposition 13
(New York Times, 1978a). While nationwide, more than 40% of
Americans favored cutting relief programs "alot," and an "overwhelming number" of those favoring service cuts cited "welfare
and social services" as clearly their most preferred target (New
York Times, 1978a, 1977c, 1978b; Gallup, 1979). As part of the
rationale, more than one-third of Americans incorrectly believed
the majority of recipients were receiving more than they were
legally entitled to (Gallup, 1978); and thus when asked which
welfare reforms were most needed, the majority of Americans
called for "better screening methods." The second most common
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response was to get those who can work off the welfare rolls
(Gallup, 1977).
These attitudes were soon reflected in governmental policy.
The amount of real-dollar expenditures on public assistance levelled out in the 1980s, and the post-transfer income of the bottom one-fifth of American families declined 4.4% in real dollars. 11
Thus, in absolute terms, the rich are getting richer and the
poor are getting poorer-a reality that is both reinforced and
enhanced by "Welfare State Capitalism." And as the middle/
working class got poorer as well, it tended to focus its blame on
highly visible public assistance monies flowing to the poor rather
than the less visible "tribute" flowing to the rich. However, public opinion toward "welfare" seems finally to have begun to
moderate as Reagan-era austerity measures, combined with the
economic polarization occurring during deindustrialization, have
left hundreds of thousands homeless and long lines at the soup
kitchens (AuClaire, 1984). Whether such wrath will now be directed toward the owning class remains to be seen.
Conclusion
This study began by asking in what ways and how much
does the American political-economic system function to transfer income between classes. To begin to answer that question
it utilized a "Welfare State Capitalism" model and focused on
income transfers between 1965 and 1984. What it found was a
system that exploits the middle/working class, struggles to
maintain the poor at subsistence, further enhances the dominant
position of the capital-owning class, and leads to an at least
temporary diversion of middle/working class wrath.
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Footnotes
1. Are there significant class divisions within the "middle/working class"?
For example, is there not a significant difference between the Safeway
store manager and the check-out clerks? Clearly the former does have a
degree of power over the latter. However, that manager has been hired
to maximize profits for Safeway stockholders. Thus, decisional leeway is
limited; and the manager's personal interests are subordinated to those
of the company's owners in virtually the very same way the clerk's are.
They are playing different roles, but the bottom line is the same for both.
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They must do what they can to turn acceptable profits for those who own
the institution. And if they fail, they lose their jobs.
As for the self-employed, the proportion of the American population
in that category, with no non-family members working for them, has
shrunk steadily since the nation began and is now less than 8% (Reich,
1972). Yet, this is still a sizable number of people, and as a group they
remain difficult to categorize. They are dearly not capitalists, as they are
not extracting profits from the labor of others. By the same token, they
are not really workers either, as they are not having their labor exploited
by a capitalist. Thus, they end up as a group in between; but in fact,
they can be seen as small-scale glimpse of a socialist-type economic arrangement in which all would control the businesses within which they
labored.
2. As for specific methodology, I took after-tax corporate profit figures from
the Survey of Current Business and converted them to constant 1984 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index. I then subtracted the constant-dollar
Contract Profit, Interest Profit, and Conduit Profit amounts calculated
and discussed in the sections below so as not to double-count them.
Lastly, I used estimates of the percentage of corporate stock held by the
top 5% of American adults (see note #8) in order to calculate the share
of these profits garnered by the "owning class." Now, all of this excludes
profits made by partnerships and proprietorships; but, they tend to be
small firms with relatively few employees, and as a group only account
for approximately 10% of all sales. Nonetheless, in as much as a number
of their owners would fall into my "owning class" category, ignoring their
profits from these firms simply makes my "private-sector profit" figure
a more conservative measure by understating the total.
3. Methodologically, I took the StatisticalAbstracts of the United States figures
for all taxes paid each year, and multiplied each by that year's middle/
working class percentage of national income. I then converted the resulting figures into real 1984 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. The
results were as follows: 1965-$2597, 1966-$2810, 1967-$2879, 1968-$2936,
1969-$3263, 1970-$3197, 1971-$3011, 1972-$3278, 1973-$3341, 1974$3286, 1975-$3112, 1976-$3155, 1977-$3445, 1978-$3528, 1979-$3507,
1980-$3343, 1981-$3443, 1982-$3277, 1983-$3178. The latter figures are
conservative estimates, however, not only for the reason cited in the text
but also because the recent reduction in the federal income tax burden
has most likely made the overall tax structure regressive. If that is true,
the middle/working class is no doubt paying even more of the nationwide
tax burden today.
It should also be noted that federal Social Security payments are not
being included as "taxes" in this study, even though that is a payment
that is not optional.
4. See note #2 for an explanation of how I estimated the share gained by
the owning class and how such corporate figures are conservative estimates in that they ignore partnerships and proprietorships. Also, it should
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be noted that these figures include both direct cash payments and the
calculated value of "benefits-in-kind."
5. To arrive at these estimates, I took Survey of Current Business figures on
federal, state, and local government purchases of services and durable
and non-durable goods and structures. I then subtracted all money going
to employee compensation-conservatively assuming no income was accrued by the owning class in such transactions-and converted each
yearly figure to constant 1984 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
But at that point I needed to derive an appropriate after-tax average
corporate profit rate for each year, which would then be applied to governmental purchase figures in order finally to estimate after-tax corporate
profits from these transactions. Thus, I calculated such a profits-to-sales
ratio by taking the after-tax corporate profit figures calculated above and
dividing them by Survey of Current Business figures on "corporate receipts" from sales and services less allowances, rebates, and returns (excluding capital gains/losses and investment income not associated with
taxpaying businesses).
Corporate profits were then calculated as a proportion of governmental purchases each year; and the share captured by the owning class
was calculated as in note #2.
6. These after-tax profit estimates were calculated by first establishing a
functional investor profit rate on loaned money. Given that banks do
most of the lending to government and that roughly 90% of bank revenues come from interest payments, banks' net (after-tax) income was
divided by their current revenues-all using Federal Reserve Board figures. These calculated "profit rates" were then aplied to total interest paid
on governmental debt each year. The resulting after-tax profits from lending to government were then reduced to the share gained by the owning
class-as calculated in note #2.
7. In terms of methodology, I took the public assistance figures for years
1968, 1972, 1973, and 1975-1984 (Burke, 1984); and I made estimates for
the years 1965-1967, 1969-1971, and 1974 using both Burke's figures as
well as Statistical Abstracts of the United States totals for AFDC, Supplementary Aid for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, Medicaid, Food Stamps,
and 'General Assistance" in order to guide my extrapolations.
I am focusing on cash paid to the welfare recipient and items/services purchased for them, e.g., school lunches and medical care. Specifically, where approximately one-half was cash and one-third medical
payments in 1968, by 1983 only one-quarter was cash, one-third was still
medical payments, 15% was food, and 10% was housing payments. It is,
of course, presumed that the cash is spent and not saved and/or invested.
These public assistance totals are then multiplied by the average
corporate profit rate for each year (see note #5), and the share going to
the owning class is calculated in the same way it was in note #2.
It is also being assumed that the administrative portion of these
governmental expenditures is being offset by the higher than average
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profits gained in many of these transactions. In addition, there are some
indications that the administrative costs of these programs are actually
relatively low (Social Security Administration, 1972, p. 57), where it is
estimated that the administrative costs for the Supplementary Aid to the
Aged, Blind, and Disabled program were only 1.8% of its budget in
1972.
Lastly, there is some definite overlap between the "conduit profits"
and the "contract profits" discussed earlier. Nonetheless, the earlier figures are considered conservative enough to more than compensate for
that.
8. Here I took the figures for the top 1% of Americans (Smith and Franklin,
1974) and estimated figures for the top 5%. I accomplished the latter
estimate by first taking Smith and Franklin's calculation for the top 1%
in 1962 and dividing that figure by a calculation for the top 5% (Federal
Reserve Board, 1962, pp. 110-114). The resulting ratio was then applied
to Smith and Franklin's other figures in order to attain the corresponding
estimates for the top 5%. I then extrapolated for the years skipped over
in the Smith and Franklin article. A 1983 estimate was derived by using
dividends reported in 1983 tax returns (IRS, Summer 1983). I then extrapolated around that figure as well.
Stock is defined as common and preferred issues, domestic and foreign firms, certificates/shares of building and loan and savings and loan
associations, federal land bank stocks, accrued dividends, and other investments reporting equity in an enterprise, as well as stock held in trust
(though understated). And, it is being assuemd that the top income recipients and top stockholders are essentially the same group of people at
any particular point in time.
My final estimates for the proportion of stock held by the top 5% of
American adults were: 1965-78%, 1966-77%, 1967-76%, 1968-75%,
1969-74%, 1970-77%, 1971-79%, 1972-81%, 1973-75%, 1974-69%,
1975-64%, 1976-59%, 1977-60%, 1978-60%, 1979-61%, 1980-61%,
1981-62%, 1982-62%, 1983-63%, 1984-63%.
For examples of significantly higher estimates, see Butters (1953,
p. 400) and Parenti (1983, pp. 11-12).
9. With 18% of all stock held by a combination of public and private pension funds in 1983 (up from 5% in 1965), it seemed safe to estimate that
more than half of that pension-owned stock was held by the middle 75%
of American families.
10. To arrive at my estimates, I began with the 1969 figures compiled by the
Internal Revenue Service (1983). I took their figures for the share of wealth
held by the top 1% and top 5% of American adults. I divided the former
by the latter and applied that ratio to 1965 and 1972 estimates of the share
held by the top 1% in those years (Lampman, 1962; Smith and Calvert,
1965; and Smith). I also applied the ratio to 1976 and 1982 estimates of
the share held by the top 1% in those years (IRS, 1976, 1982).
My resulting estimates for the proportion of the nation's wealth pos-
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sessed by the top 5% of American adults were: 1965-48%, 1969-42%,
1972-44%, 1976-44%, and 1982-42%.
"Wealth" is defined as all corporate stock, trusts, bonds, savings, life
insurance, and real estate-less liabilities.
11. To arrive at this figure, I took the high-income cutoff point for the bottom
20% of American families. In 1980, it was $13,058, but it had declined
to $12,489 by 1984-all in 1984 dollars (Bureau of the Census).
It should be noted, however, that I have not attempted to make adjustments for "benefits-in-kind" transfer income. First, it is not disposable income, and thus it ought not to be counted in the same way. Secondly,
such calculations open a real methodological "can of worms." For example, if we calculate the disproportionate benefit the poor receive from
Medicaid, why not also calculate the disproportionate benefits the wealthiest gain from national defense, State Department trade efforts, domestic infrastructure, and so on? Lastly, even if such benefits are included
(Browning, 1976), they are still funded largely by the middle/working
class.
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A Sociological Model
RAGHU

N. SINGH

East Texas State University
N. PRABHA UNNITHAN
Colorado State University
JAMES

D. JONES

East Texas State University

The paper demonstrates the conceptual meaning and utility of a sociological model for identifying correlates of the fear of AIDS and its
consequent changes on peoples' behaviors. A sociological notion of

levels of analysis is employed for classifying correlates of AIDS' fears
under structural and individual categories. A tentative list of these
correlates and their projected relationship with peoples' fears is sug-

gested to illustrate the model.

The fear of contracting an infectious disease, such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), often generates
a number of changes in individual and social behavior. The
major objective of this paper is to propose a sociological model
that may aid in the research and analysis of the impact of such
fear. The model demonstrates the usefulness of identifying factors, at various analytical levels, that affect individual behavior
and orientations in relation to the fear of AIDS.
AIDS infection, which causes devastation in every major
organ system of the body (Saxton, 1985), or an "immunological
anarchy" (Fetter & Check, 1984), is presumed to be largely transmitted through semen, blood, or to fetuses in the uterus (Batchelor, 1984). Recent statistics from the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control indicate that AIDS' victims have largely been homosexual or bisexual men, relatively young (90% are 20-49 years of
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age), white (60%, versus 25% black, 14% Hispanic), and mainly
urban dwellers (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 1986).
Overall, reports from six European countries (Denmark,
France, Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom) reveal a "constant increase in number
of AIDS cases" (CDC, 1986). Recent estimates also indicate that
due to a stigma of homosexuality attached to AIDS disease, there
are actually 50% more cases of AIDS than are reported (Feldman
& Johnson, 1986). With the long-hoped-for "flattening of the
epidemiological curve" still elusive, some have suggested that
AIDS cases are likely to multiply very rapidly in the future (Bayer,
1985; Clark, 1985). As far as exposure to the AIDS virus is concerned, recent estimates in the U.S. range from one million people (Fetter & Check, 1984) to two million (Adler, 1985), along
with a trend indicating that the number of cases is increasing
steadily (Clarke, 1985).
A phenomenon with such widespread social impact should
attract the attention of a variety of disciplines. Research delineating the etiological chain of events and factors leading up to the
disease, as well as analyzing the consequent social changes,
needs to be carried out (Institute of Medicine, 1986). Reviews
of the literature on AIDS indicate that, so far, mainly medical
scientists, along with a few psychologists and journalists, have
rigorously studied the phenomenon. In 1984, for example, Simpkins and Eberhage maintained that their search of the literature
did not yield any systematic social science research on AIDS
and, therefore, related policy decisions seemed to have been
based upon anecdotal evidence or polls conducted by the media.
Martin and Vance (1985) point out that the social sciences have
been slow in researching AIDS because of the lack of awareness
of the role psychosocial factors play in the spread of the disease.
A recent commentary on the sociological study of AIDS (Kaplan,
Johnson, Bailey, and Simon, 1987) acknowledges that studies
that explicitly address research questions relating to the onset
and course of AIDS frequently consider too narrow a scope of
explanatory factors. Feldman and Johnson (1986, p. 36) point
out that, "only recently has there been a grudging acceptance on
the part of some biomedical researchers that AIDS cannot fully
be understood solely from a biomedical perspective; understanding requires additional input from social and behavioral
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scientists." Other authors have urged social and behavioral scientists to get involved in AIDS research as their studies "would
be translatable into intervention" (Kaplan et al., 1987), and "could
be the only hope for stopping the spread of AIDs through prevention" (Batchelor, 1984). This research gap is even more noticeable with regard to the impact of AIDS on society, particularly
the widespread fear it appears to have generated.
The Impact of AIDS
Epidemic diseases are terrifying both in the suddenness with
which they can sweep through a community and in the apparent
arbitrariness with which they strike their victims. Diseases like
AIDS have "stigma potential" driving their victims into "closets"
and the general public into mass hysteria (Schneider & Conrad,
1985) through the contagion of hysteria and anxieties (Gehlen,
1977) as well as epidemics of "exaggerated fears" (Kapp, 1972).
Several recent studies have declared AIDS to be a unique lethal
disease "becoming a source of terror throughout every segment
of society" (Batchelor, 1984, p. 1279). In Britain, AIDS has been
reported by the media as the new "plague" and a "terrible tragedy" in today's world (Fisher, 1985). Various scientists have labeled AIDS as an "epidemic" in the U.S. in spite of relatively
few known cases (Altman, 1984; Morin, Charles, and Mayon,
1984). A Newsweek Poll in August 1985 reported that 41% of
Americans feared AIDS (Adler, 1985), and the Texas Poll of 1000
adults in October, 1985 reported that 45% of the respondents
had fears or worries of AIDS infections (Dyer, 1986). Schmidt
(1984) considers the disease as an epidemic with public fears
comparable to fears of leprosy in the Middle Ages. Batchelor
(1984) feels that AIDS is creating a psychological emergency in
the Western World, and Clarke (1985) states it is causing irrational fear, paranoia, and apocalyptic statements among the public. The media have been criticized for sensationalistic reporting
that promoted widespread fear and panic (Feldman & Johnson,
1986). Some have favored a quarantine of AIDS patients in order
to stop them from spreading the disease (Albert, 1984), and
there have been other threats to homosexual civil rights (Rubinow & Joffe, 1987) as well as social shunning (Christ & Wiener,
1985).
The study of how diseases affect human groups and the ways
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in which groups react to disease have been important concerns
in history (Cartwright, 1980), anthropology (Malinowski, 1944;
Rothschild, 1981), epidemiology (Dever, 1984; Morris, 1970; Vogt,
1983) and sociology (Fabrega, 1974; Suchman, 1963). While several studies in the past have examined the impact of a disease
in general (Dever, 1984), more recent ones have made efforts
toward specifying and even quantifying these impacts (Kleinbaum, Lawrence, and Morgenstern, 1982; Cleary & Kessler, 1982;
Finney, Mitchell, Cronkite, and Moose, 1984). Some studies have
also focused on various behavioral consequencces of epidemics.
Schofield (1970) for example, studied behavioral changes among
hermit monks in Ethiopia due to leprosy and tuberculosis. Since
the 1960's, several sociologists have explored the preventive health
behaviors of people as related to the prevalence of various illnesses (Langlie, 1977). Overall, studies of the impact of AIDS on
individuals and their behavior may be grouped under the following categories. First, many popular media accounts and commentaries have talked about the effects of AIDS on society in
general (Adler, 1985; Fisher, 1985; Seligmann & Grosnell, 1985).
Second, a few writers have chosen to focus on the problem of
AIDS epidemic in specific urban communities (Brown, 1985;
Perlman, 1984). Third, some studies have assessed the impact
of AIDS on special populations, particularly homosexual males
(Ebbeson, Melbye, and Biggar, 1984; Kotarba & Lang, 1986;
Klovdahl, 1985; Geis, Fuller, and Rush, 1987). Fourth, other psychological studies have recently been concerned with the impact
of AIDS on its victims (Dilley, 1985; Hess, Markson, and Stein,
1985; Lessor & Katarin, 1984; Lopez & Getzel, 1984; Rubinow
& Joffe, 1987). Fifth, a few studies have begun to report behavioral changes (such as precautions related to "safe sex") in the
general population that may have been prompted by AIDs (Riesenberg, 1986; Callero, Baker, Carpenter, and Margarigal, 1986;
Silin, 1987; Leukefeld & Fimbres, 1987). From these diverse
sources, it may be implied that a variety of changes are taking
place in specific areas of behavior due to an underlying fear of
exposure to AIDS and/or contact with those who could be touched
by the disease (i.e. the 'at risk' groups).
It should be noted, however, that the existing literature on
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the impact of AIDS appears to have been largely descriptive,
selective and limited. While more studies are needed to delineate the nature and extent of AIDS-related problems, important
questions, such as which social groups and institutional areas
are more or less susceptible to behavioral changes and the modes
by which fear of this disease is transmitted in the public, also
need to be investigated.
Sociologists have long questioned the validity of etiological
analyses (Graham, 1964; Kurtz & Chalfant, 1984) utilized by
various epidemiologists in attempting to identify the causes and
consequences of diseases. The natural and social sciences have
traditionally been deterministic and reductionistic in their approaches, concerned more with the "isolation of independent
relationships than with the understanding and predicting of behavior" (Yinger, 1965, p. 19). It has been recently stated that a
significant limitation of the literature is that all the known or
suspected predictors of risk for HIV infection and/or immune
deficiency states have not been considered simultaneously within
an overarching theoretical framework; nor has there been sufficient consideration of the factors that influence the experience
of AIDS-related stress or the modes of response to such stress
(Kaplan et al., 1987). There is a need to consider a complex phenomenon such as the fear of AIDS and its consequences beyond
the etiological chain of events. Ideally, explanatory variables at
various analytical levels should be used to study the impacts of
AIDS on peoples' behaviors.
This paper is a first attempt in this direction. We use traditional sociological notions of levels of analysis and associated
structural and individual factors to propose a model of the antecedents and consequences of the fear of AIDS.
Explaining the Fear and Its Impact
The fear of AIDS should not be assumed to have caused a
uniform set of social and behavioral changes. Fear, rational or
irrational, may result in complex responses. Kotarba and Lang
(1986, p. 128) contend that the prototypical model in this regard
is the "smoking-and-cancer" phenomenon, and that "the turnaround associated with the Surgeon General's report and the
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decrease in cigarette smoking has been gradual and has varied
according to gender, age, and other factors." Further, the wellknown health belief model (Becker, 1974; Janz & Becker, 1984)
suggests that service utilization is based on the (a) perceived
susceptibility of the individual to the disease, (b) perceived seriousness of the disease, (c) perceived benefits and barriers of
taking action against the disease, and (d) the cues that motivate
the action process in the individual. Wolinsky (1980) adds that
the individual's perceptions are modified and developed as a
result of his or her sociocultural background. Thus, depending
on numerous structural and individual factors, behavioral
changes due to the fear of AIDS, can vary widely. It would
appear that fear of AIDS can result in behavior that attempts to
reduce the risk of exposure as well as to behavior that is essentially reckless and fatalistic. Our purpose here is to provide a
heuristic model for analyzing the factors affecting the fear of
AIDS and the resulting behavioral changes. The specific direction of these changes needs to be established empirically.
Explanations of a phenomenon may be sought at either macro or micro levels of study. The issue is whether the study
should be focused on the micro actions and interactions of individuals or the macro social structures that such actions and
interactions create. Macrosociology looks at the total size, shape,
structures, and processes involved at large, studying the character of the forest, independently of the trees which compose it.
Microsociology, on the other hand, deals with small-scale social
phenomena, the social atoms of experience, seeing "social structure as nothing more than the processes of action and interaction
among individuals" (Turner, 1986, pp. 436-437). Actually, there
need not be differences or contradictions between macrosociology and microsociology-it is simply a matter of the starting
point that one wishes to take. While macro-holistic theories such
as the Parsonsian model of the social system start with "society
in general" and then come down to the "units-subsystem of
society", the micro-atomistic perspective starts with the "individual-group in particular" and from there draws implications
for the total society (Cohen, 1968).
A number of conceptual approaches identifying phenomena
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at various analytical levels have been advanced in the literature.
One such approach is to divide a study into several categories
or areas of focus. For example, Durkheim's classical study (1965)
attempted to analyze various components of primitive religion
at three levels: (1) societal beliefs, (b) institutional rites, and
(c) individual actions. A systematic treatment using a similar
approach was given by Parsons (1951) who analytically divided
the study of the "system of social action" into (a) the personality
system, comprising the actor's motives and goals, (b) the cultural
system, consisting of the values, beliefs, and symbols which
pervade a society, and (c) the social system, involving a network
of social interaction. In order to explain an individual's behavior,
Wallace (1983) considers two categories of sociological explanatory variables, the first consisting of the individual's ""internal
strains" exerted mainly by his/her own body or own mind, and
the second consisting of "external constraints" exerted mainly
by people or things in their environment. Lewin (1951) recommends a relatively comprehensive and gestaltic approach in
which a "field" of study is viewed as a "holistic interaction nexus,"
meaning that the parts influence one another and include both
causes and consequences of focal objects or events. Following
that logic in the "field theory of behavior," Yinger (1965) suggests
that the study of human behavior be carried out at four levelsbiological, individual, cultural, and social. Kaufman's (1959)
analysis of social phenomena includes four levels: (1) ecological
or demographic, (b) cultural or institutional, (c) social or interactional, and (d) individual or psychological. Johnson (1981) has
proposed an appealing model consisting of the following levels
for the study of social reality: (a) the individual level subdivided
into the behavioral versus the subjective levels, focusing in either
case not so much on the individual as such but on units of
behaviors, motives and attitudes; (b) the interpersonal level, involving interaction between individuals with all that this means
in terms of symbolic communication, mutual adjustment, negotiations, interpersonal cooperation or conflict, and joint or interlocking patterns of adaptation to the larger environment; (c) the
social structural level, in which the focus is not the individual
but the patterns of the action and networks of interaction that

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

are inferred from observation of regularities and uniformities
over time and space; and (d) the cultural level represented by
meanings, values, symbols, artifacts, and norms.
A Proposed Model
An etiological model identifying a series of variables in order
to explain the fear of AIDS and its behavioral consequences is
not likely to be a simple one. Epidemiologists are increasingly
recognizing the complexity of health disorders, their sources, as
well as consequences (Cockerham, 1986). The suggestions made
below are examples of efforts that are needed toward developing
an understanding of the sources and impacts of the fear of AIDS.
First, two types of etiological factors in the fear of AIDS may
be differentiated at the levels of analysis identified earlier. The
first set include social structural variables such as environmental
and demographic characteristics, institutional arrangements, and
social groupings and relationships relevant to the AIDS' epidemic. The second set includes biological, psychological, and
social behavior characteristics of the individual involved.
Second, the epidemic and the consequences it brings about,
including fear, have to be conceptualized as a social process. A
social process may be defined as "a sequence of interactions
through time, with general continuity of goal or direction, and
with step-by-step emergence of one state or stage of social relationship from another" (Wilkinson, 1970, p. 312). Thus the
phenomenon of fear of AIDS, its correlates, and consequences
have to be viewed in terms of a temporal sequence of various
events, activities, and relationships involving environmental and
institutional structures as well as individuals. An ideal design
for the investigation of an epidemic as a process would consist
of a longitudinal study identifying various causes and consequences of the disease, or fear of it, over a period of time.
A model based upon the principles stated above postulating
the relationships among different sets of variables is sketched
in Figure 1. The structural and the individual variables are considered here as initial antecedent factors affecting the growth of
AIDS' fears. The antecedent (structural and individual) variables
are shown as interacting with each other. (The double arrows
are used to suggest interactional effects.) This reflects the as-
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sumption that for many forms of social behavior and attitudes,
instead of assuming causal priority of either structural or individual factors, these could more usefully be conceptualized as
reciprocal and mutually interdependent. The fear of contracting
AIDS is considered to be an intervening variable and the behavioral consequences of that fear constitute the dependent variables. Though not shown in Figure 1, the intervening and
dependent variables in turn would also affect the structural and
individual variables in the long run bringing about changes in
them. We are thereby implying not only a sequential and interactive causal model, but also a circular one. However, the model
illustrated in Figure 1 is neither meant to be exhaustive nor
final. It merely represents an example of possible relationships
whose value depends on future empirical tests. It is thus tentative, and needs to be operationalized, studied and revised if
necessary.
The dependent variables consist of changes in peoples' own
behaviors caused by their concern for contracting AIDS. However, the model's focus is on those behavioral impacts which
relate to reducing risks of infection rather than the full range of
private and public responses to the fear of AIDS. Changes in
behavior as a result of the fear of AIDS should also be conceptualized as a continuum. In other words, individuals may position themselves differently in modifying behaviors in various
areas of their lives, or deciding not to do so. Examples of various
areas of their lives in the context of which their behaviors may
be examined include: (a) sexuality (involving modifications of
sexual behaviors such as kissing, touching, number of sex partners, using condoms); (b) physical and mental health related
behaviors (utilizing health services by getting frequent checkups and antibody tests, creating private blood bank sources,
developing emotional stress); (c) family and marriage related
behaviors (deciding to stay married or get married, feeling strains
in marital adjustment or in relationships with growing children
and their socialization and schooling); (d) job-related behaviors
(making adjustments in business or the work place, changing
jobs, having problems of hirings and firings); and (e) social interaction behaviors (feeling increased social distance with people, curtailing leisure and recreation activities such as eating out
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and travelling, having to move from one place to another). In
addition, there may be other private and public behavioral responses to the fear of AIDS such as social shunning of, and
attacks on, gays, support of AIDS testing and quarantining of
people with AIDS.
The intervening variable consists of the fear of contracting
AIDS. A scale measuring it should be indicative of both degrees
of intensity as well as the substantive nature of the fear, e.g., in
which areas of social life the individual feels most threatened
by AIDS, and which individuals or groups are identified as
most likely to evoke such fear.
Examples of explanatory variables at the structural level would
include: (a) population composition, density of population, type
of community, incidence of AIDS in the immediate environment; (b) nature and types of existing institutional structures
(health care, mass media, norms for sexual preferences); and
(c) social interactions (social support, networkings among
homosexual groups). Examples of individual-level variables
would include peoples' attitudes, perceptions, activities, and
socioeconomic characteristics relevant to selected areas of their
lives. These are: (a) own and partners' sexual preference (heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual); (b) attitude toward homosexuals and bisexuals (e.g., homophobia); (c) degree to which
one is sexually active; (d) level and nature of drug use intravenous or not; (e) perception of own health/well-being as well as
of those known to him/her personally (particularly if anyone has
AIDS infection/exposure); (f) knowledge of the AIDS problem,
including access to and sources of information used; (g) use of
unknown sources of blood donations in the past; (h) whether an
individual has tested positive for AIDS or AIDS-related complex;
and (i) social background, such as socio-economic status (in
terms of occupation, education, and income), measures of class
mobility, age, gender, race/ethnic identity, and marital status.
Suggested Hypotheses
Based on this model it is possible to state a few hypotheses
predicting the relationships of the explanatory variables with
the intervening and dependent variables. These hypotheses are
meant to be illustrative and tentative, and their validity is to be
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tested by social researchers. It should also be noted that these
hypotheses have much in common with ideas implicit in the
health belief model mentioned earlier although we conceive of
health service utilization as only one possible behavioral outcome of the fears of AIDS. Our suggested hypotheses do imply
that structural and individual factors act as a means of affecting
"perceived susceptibility" to AIDS, of "perceived seriousness"
to the disease, and as "perceived benefits of and barriers to
taking action" against the disease, as well as "cues that motivate
the action process" in the individual. They should thus be read
in the context of whether or not the various factors cited serve
to heighten or reduce the perception of being "at risk" and the
motivation for some kind of consequent action.
The following are examples of hypotheses at the two levels
of analysis.
Structural level. (a) Urban dwellers who live in high population
density areas are more likely to have fears of AIDS as compared
to people residing and working in open country sides. This is
based on the assumption that metropolitan areas involve an extensity of social interactions that generate and spread epidemiological fears. (b) People who reside in communities that have a
known or publicized "above-average" or frequent incidence of people with AIDS are more likely to experience a fear of that disease
and attempt to change their behaviors as compared to those living
in geographical regions and communities with fewer incidents of
AIDS cases. (c) Similarly, people who live in an ecological area
which has a preponderance of singles and relatively younger population are more likely to have AIDS' fears as compared to those
who live in neighborhoods of married and middle-age to older
people. Physical proximity to those who are generally believed to
be "more susceptible" to AIDS virus may generate anxieties among
people inhibiting social interactions and neighborhood ties.
(d) People who live in communities whose health care systems are
known to be inadequate in dealing with treatment and prevention
of AIDS' epidemic are likely to have fears of that diseaase more
than ones in those communities where special efforts have been
made with regard to handling the epidemic. It is assumed that the
poor quality health management leads to insecurities among people about their own vulnerability to diseases. (e) People who have
been exposed to competitive and sensationalistic mass media
sources of information on AIDS are more likely to have fears of the
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disease as compared to those who are knowledgeable about AIDS
through relatively scientific sources. (f) People who have adequate
social support and sources of networking, including those who are
"at risk" groups, tend to have fewer fears of AIDS as compared to
those whose intimate group supports are lacking.
Individual level. (a) Homosexual and bisexual males (including females who think that they have been exposed to bisexual males)
are likely to have greater fear of AIDS and consequently make
changes in their behaviors than those who are strictly heterosexual.
(b) Males and females who have been promiscuous in sexual encounters with others (including those who feel that they have been
sexually interacting with persons whose other sexual partners are
either unknown or might be suspected to be promiscuous as well)
are likely to have greater fears of AIDS than those who are relatively
monogamous in sexual relations. (c) Individuals who personally
know someone/others who has/have contracted AIDS are more
likely to have fears of the disease as compared to those who are
impersonally aware of the problem. It is assumed that the knowledge of AIDS related problems experienced by someone personally
known may generate fears about ones own well-being. (d) Persons
who use IV drugs and share needles with others tend to have
greater fears of AIDS as compared to others. (e)) Individuals who
have received blood from unknown sources during the past eight
years or so are more likely to be fearful of AIDS than others.
(f) Individuals who have a history of illnesses during the past few
years and are generally "worried well" or preoccupied with health
are likely to experience fears of AIDS than those who have been
feeling generally healthy. (g) Individuals in middle to upper socioeconomic strata tend to have a greater degree of AIDS' fear as
compared to ones in lower strata. It is assumed that levels of
knowledge of the epidemic and degrees of rationality in dealing
with it are higher among people in middle and upper classes as
compared to lower class.
It may also be speculated that the fear of AIDS and consequent behavioral changes will in turn have an impact on individual's psychological make-up and ultimately on social structural
factors. For example, there may be increases in paranoia and
prejudice leading to more spatial mobility (leaving areas perceived to be AIDS-prone, say from urban to rural areas), and
segregation and institutional social control (e.g. requiring AIDS
testing as a prerequisite for employment). Hypotheses suggest-
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ing interactions among all sorts of factors will need to be carefully stated as the conceptual model stated above is tested and
refined. Various research and policy implications of the model
will also need to be delineated. For now it does appear that the
identification of the etiological factors at various analytical levels
assists in sorting them out, specifying their interconnectedness,
and assessing their relative effects on people and their behaviors. The approach utilizing "levels of analysis", therefore, may
be seen in this context as a heuristic device, enhancing our
understanding in a relatively comprehensive manner.
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Recent public policy initiatives including deinstitutionalization, deregulation, decentralization, and privatization have resulted in: (a) rapid
growth in the number of private not-for-profit organizations; and,
(b) competitive environments. These conditions have forced agencies
to examine their planning processes to determine if agency goals are
appropriatefor meeting market demands. An exploratory study of 154
human service agencies examined if and how strategic planning was
used to respond to these conditions. The Chief Executive Officers for
those agencies reported that strategic planning was replacing incremental planning as a preferred planning model. However, the choice
resulted because of pressurefrom outside influentials not because of a
perception of increased competition. Despite this, agencies choosing a
strategic planning model were generally rigorous in its application.
One-half of the sample reported a "major" change outcome for the
agency as a result of the planning process but broad participation by
stakeholders impeded substantial change. Questions are raised about
using strategic planning when major change is not sought and/or broad
participationby stakeholders is important.

During the last twenty years, the number of private, voluntary, service organizations (PVSOs) increased dramatically.
The vast majority are operated as not-for-profit (as opposed to
for-profit and governmental) organizations under the Internal
Revenue Service Code. Although growth in this third sector
(Weiner, 1982) of the nation's economy reflects a range of concerns, e.g. promotion of the arts and protection of the environ-
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ment, it is particularly apparent in the social service field where
a multitude of new agencies were organized to provide supportive services to maintain independent community living for persons previously institutionalized including the elderly and
persons with physical, developmental, or mental disabilities.
Few would dispute the notion that an increase in the number
of PVSOs coupled with a public policy stance promoting local
decision-making and less regulation substantially alters the organizational environment. Stripped of the protection previously
afforded by governments' categorically specified funding patterns and non-competitive purchase of service awards, PVSOs
now also face a fast-growing number of for-profit health and
social service organizations offering services attractive to middle
class "private pays." In short, PVSOs find themselves in an increasingly competitive environment.
Today, both public administrators and PVSO management
are searching for an optimum mixture of competition and regulation. Furthermore, government agencies are placing more responsibility on PVSOs to gauge the needs of their constituencies
and demonstrate organizational effectiveness in meeting those
needs. Therefore, it is important to examine this sizable sector
of our economy to determine how PVSOs are responding to the
challenges of their new market conditions. One area that can be
expected to change is management's planning function. Of particular interest is the extent to which PVSO management has
forsaken planning decision structures based on a monopolistic,
regulated environment and incorporated in their stead decision
structures designed to deal with a competitive environment.
Other responses are, of course, possible. For example, agencies
may abandon the search for an independent niche. An early
report from a nationwide study of the influence of competitive
and cost containment forces on health and social service agencies
serving the elderly recommends voluntary homemaker/chore
agencies merge with large home health agencies (Wood & Estes,
1986-87).
Historically, PVSOs relied upon a "disjointed incrementalism" (DI) decision model, first labelled and elaborated by Lindblom (1959). Incrementalism, also referred to as "partisan mutual
adjustment" or "muddling through" urges practitioners to analyze policy choices which are successive "limited comparisons"
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with existing procedures. The model assumes the best solution
for any given problem is the one which inspires the most consensus, a consensus achieved through a partisan mutual adjustment process. Praised for its ability to describe decision
making behavior in the "real" planning arena of pluralistic politics, DI is nonetheless criticized for its reliance on consensusbuilding and existing policy thrusts, its relative neglect of contextual considerations, the short-time frame perspectives it embodies, and the small degree of change which usually results
when it is adopted. Lindblom's original article spawned numerous critiques of both incremental and rational comprehensive planning processes. The main themes of the debate are
captured by Dror (1969), Etzioni, (1967, 1986), and Lindblom
(1979).
Until the mid-1970's, PVSOs thrived in an environment especially congenial to the consensus, coalition, domain consensus values featured in the DI model. During that period, Federal
social policy attempted to create an efficient system of service
delivery through the design of comprehensive delivery systems
without gaps and duplications-in short, a subsidized monopolistic system which sought to dampen competitive forces. Because the DI model mandates a collapsed time frame, limited
solutions and accepts a limited environmental analysis, it is an
appropriate planning choice in a stable, highly regulated noncompetitive environment.
Today's new and more competitive environment is stimulating PVSO management to adopt a "strategy planning" model
which was developed in the corporate sector to select future
directions. In 1980 the United Way of America, following the
corporate example, changed the name of its planning division
to "Strategic Planning." Of the 800 member organizations with
full-time staff affiliated with the United Way of America, 62
percent had completed a strategic plan development process by
1984. Franchise systems such as the Red Cross, Boy Scouts, Family Service Associations and the Girl Scouts have also adopted
strategic planning (SP) and provide technical assistance to their
affiliates to help them develop strategic plans.
Strategy planning, deeply rooted in such "synoptic traditions" (Hudson, 1979) as rational, comprehensive and long-range
planning, is the term used by private sector management theor-
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ists to describe those planning processes "which one did to
counteract what a competitor did or was likely to do" (Steiner,
1979). Hofer and Schendel (1973) suggest strategy planning is an
appropriate response to environmental change. Clearly, it is seen
as a management tool to gain competitive advantage.
There is general agreement that strategic planning encompasses those processes and tasks required to choose organizational goals and develop and implement a plan to achieve them.
Strategic planning assumes complex social phenomena can be
understood, that means can be connected to ends and their relationships predicted, that alternative means can be identified,
and that a "best" means can be selected, implemented, and
evaluated. Strategic planning's emphasis on long-range perspectives, comprehensive environmental analysis, and on extensive
solution search lends itself to informing management decision
processes in a competitive environment. The model is praised
for its capacity to identify a broad range of solution options and
its potential for promoting fundamental change. It is criticized
for its tendency to support elite decision-making and unwillingness to admit knowledge limitations on achieving comprehensive perspectives and predicting the consequences of
alternative means. Limitations notwithstanding, SP is widely
used in the corporate sector. There is a considerable literature
concluding that strategic planning and formal strategy analysis
do have a positive impact on the performance of business organizations as measured by profit and market share (Beard &
Dess, 1981; Herold, 1972; Schendel et al., 1976; Schoeffler et al.,
1974; Thompson & Strickland, 1983).
It has often been the case that management innovations are
developed for private for-profit firms. As these innovations become more widely known they are adopted by the not-for-profit
sector. In order to determine the degree to which this is occurring with respect to strategic planning three principal questions
were defined to guide an exploratory study of PVSO management planning activities:
1. What prompts PSVOs to use SP?
2. What planning process variations occur when strategic planning
is undertaken by PVSOs?
3. What affects strategic planning outcomes?
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Because the study was primarily interested in SP processes
within PVSOs, the sample was purposely constructed to net a
large number of SP users. Three urban areas (two Southwestern
and one Eastern) were selected which were identified by the
United Way of America as receiving SP emphasis from the local
United Way. Each of the three United Ways supplied a complete
list of all organizational affiliates, and it is that list which comprised the total sample.
Data were solicited by mail questionnaire from the sample's
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). The eight page mail questionnaire sought detailed information on a number of organizational
and environmental characteristics including size, funding
sources, planning capabilities of the staff and CEOs, services
offered, affiliation, perceived environmental changes, and data
on planning activities, knowledge and use of planning aids,
planning outcomes, and satisfaction with the planning endeavor.
The 154 responding organizations represented 56% of those
receiving the survey instrument. Eighty-eight (57%) had selected a strategic planning process, 93 percent of those within
the last six years. All of the PVSOs are human service organizations, but do differ in services provided, target populations,
and annual budgets. Included in the sample are such agencies
as advocacy organizations, family service agencies, neighborhood and half-way houses, hospitals and community based
health and mental health agencies, residential care facilities, etc.
Annual budgets ranged from under $100.00 for a volunteer management assistance organization to over $100 million for a large
hospital.
What Prompts PVSOs To Use SP?
To examine just what influences an organization to adopt SP,
differences were explored between PVSOs that used SP and
those that did not. Three types of factors were posed as potentially influential: funding sources, organizational characteristics,
and market conditions.
1. Funding Sources: sources of operating revenues for the agency.
2. Organizational characteristics: organizational size; management trained in SP; new management; national or state affiliation; past planning experiences; staff-board planning
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resources; availability of agency data to guide planning; perceived mission flexibility.
3. Market conditions: changing clients, pressures to plan from
funders or affiliates, increased direct competition (competition with organizations offering similar services/products) or
indirect competition (with organizations offering different
services/products but dependent on same sources for capital);
changing service products; pressure to expand or contract;
perception other organizations are using SP; conflict regrowth/cutback.
Factors selected were culled from a combination of sources
including the author's experiential convictions based on previous consulting activities, interviews with key informants, and
reports in the literature.
A regression analysis (using dummy variables) was conducted with factors identified in a preliminary bivariate analysis
which suggested a predictor effect on PVSOs use of SP (Table 1).
(Note: The equations used do not conform to standard Ordinary
Least Squares assumptions. Therefore, a sample of the estimated
equations was reestimated using Probit analysis, and the size
of the coefficients and tests of significance did not vary.) The
regression analysis produced a set of predictors accounting for
a modest amount of variance (25%) distinguishing between those
PVSOs using SP and those that do not. Obviously, those organizations required to adopt an SP model by an external source
do so. The remaining factors, although significant, individually
account for a very small amount of the variance. Data do not
support the hypotheses that managers in the sample choose strategic planning because they perceive competition in their environment. Managers use SP because, put quite simply, they are
required or encouraged by an external source to do so.
Further confounding the issue of choice in the selection of
SP is the fact that an awareness of increased indirect competition
was negatively associated with SP use. Additionally, the negligible effect of an awareness of direct competition in the organizational environment (which did not achieve significance in the
regression) suggests SP appears to occur for reasons largely unrelated to the purposes for which it was created. If indeed CEOs
choose SP primarily because of external pressure, then there is
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Table 1
Regression Analysis of Decision to Do Strategic Planning
N = 154

Dependent Variable = Choosing to Develop an SP
R Square
Variable

b (unstandardized)

F Value

Change

.41

21.1*

.13

United Way

.21

7.5*

.06

The agency was large

.17

5.2*

.03

.15

4.4*

.02

-. 13

3.3*

.02

-. 14

3.3*

.02

The plan was required

The agency received
funds from the

The agency received
funds from membership
dues

The agency was
experiencing indirect
competition

The agency had limited
staff/board resources to
devote to planning
R Square
.28
Adjusted R Square
.25
Constant
.39
*Meets test of significance at .05 level.

reason to expect PVSOs using SP will blend some aspects of the
old way of doing things (DI) into their SP decision models.
What SP Planning Process Variations Occur in SP?
The extent to which a "pure" SP model or a "blended" SP-DI
model is used is explored by examining variations in the planning process within the sample PVSOs reporting SP use
(N = 88). A pure SP process would encompass, for example,
completion of the entire set of prescribed tasks (see below), high
echelon stakeholder (e.g., board members and the CEO) participation and control, the use of techhical consultants, and/or de-
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cisions made on the basis of technical merit as opposed to
reconcilable differences. A blended model would be in evidence
if some model tasks are not completed, where CEO support is
stronger than CEO involvement, and where widespread stakeholder participation, the use of process facilitators, and consensus decision making are present.
Completeness of Tasks
Strategic planning commonly specifies a series of directionsetting tasks that must be accomplished before management's
implementation and monitoring activities can occur. Although
variously termed in the literature, the menu of planning tasks
requires a determination of desired organizational purpose, an
audit of internal capacities and external markets, a forecast of
opportunities and threats, and the selection and documentation
of an appropriate plan of action which will enable the organization to accomplish its stated mission. To facilitate examination
of the SP process in the sample organizations, six planning tasks
were identified:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Mission Analysis (purpose)
Internal Audit (organizational strengths and weaknesses)
External Audit (market conditions)
Forecasting (major trend analysis)
Strategy Identification and Selection
Plan Document Development

Fifty-six percent of the PVSOs choosing SP completed all six
SP tasks. Only 7% completed three or fewer. Mission Analysis,
Forecasting, and Plan Document Development were each completed by at least 90% of the organizations. The task receiving
the least attention was the External Audit (75%). Customarily,
the External Audit and Mission Analysis are considered to be
essential tasks for gaining strategic advantage (Drucker, 1974;
McConkey, 1981; Wechsler and Backoff, 1986). The lesser attention to environmental scanning and analysis suggests external
environmental considerations were relatively neglected and call
into question the bases used for strategy identification and selection. The data here suggest PVSOs have yet to give equal
parity to the external environment, a prerequisite to the achieve-
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ment of the comprehensive view of organizational choices required by SP. The SP task structure did, however, force more
environmental surveillance than would be expected from organizations accustomed to using DI planning procedures.
On the whole, the number of tasks completed by the SP user
organizations suggests a rather faithful adherence to SP model
recommendations. So does the attention to Mission Analysis by
organizations belonging to a sector which has earned a considerable reputation for ambiguous organizational goals and objectives (Demone & Harshbarger, 1974; Drucker, 1977; Newman
and Wallender, 1978; Lewis & Lewis, 1983). On the other hand,
a hint of lingering comfort with DI analysis is suggested in the
lesser attention devoted to the External Audit.
Stakeholder Participation
The sample PVSOs reported widespread involvement by high
echelon stakeholders including CEOs, board members, and management staff; much less involvement by non-management staff
and outsiders. CEOs were involved in all six tasks in 70% of the
planning efforts; comparable figures for board members and
other management staff are 51% and 48% respectively. Contrast
that with direct service "front-line" staff who were involved in
all tasks in only 11% of the cases. Outsiders and clerical staff
participated in all tasks in less than 5% of the cases. A picture
emerges of an elitist planning process.
Table 2 details stakeholder participation by SP task, controlling for the number of tasks completed. Elites participate most
frequently in the principal decision-making phases-Mission
Analysis and Strategy Identification and Selection. Management
staff and non-managerial service staff participate most often
during the Internal Audit. External stakeholders are most involved during the External Audit, but the relative paucity of
participation points to the earlier observation concerning the
lack of attention devoted to the External Audit. The degree to
which processes are elite controlled is confirmed in the mean
participation scores demonstrating all non-management stakeholders are involved much less than powerful stakeholders. A
process which is structured to minimize the required number
of decision actors is compatible with rational, comprehensive

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Table 2
Percent of Organizations With Stakeholder Participationby Task

Internal
Audit

Strategy
Selection

Mean
Participation
SCORE

Mission
Analysis

ForeCasting

Elites
CEO

98

87

81

88

99a

87

90

Board
Members

91

77

71

78

97a

77

82

Other
Management
Staff

72

79

72

80a

77

63

74

Direct Service
Persons

47

50

46

53a

52

32

47

Clerical Staff

21

18

33a

28

27

12

23

Community
Rep

25

29

43a

25

30

13

28

Clients

20

23

40a

30

29

10

25

Affiliates

17

24

35a

23

24

12

23

Funders

15

18

33a

20

21

6

19

Stakeholder

External
Audit

Plan
Document
Development

Insiders

Outsiders

a = Stakeholder High

models and considered to be desirable in promoting changeoriented decisions (Rein & Morris, 1965).
Role of Consultants and CEOs
Forty-five percent of the organizations reported using consultants during the SP process. The most frequent use (42%)
occurred during the External Audit, historically a relatively unfamiliar task for PVSO managers. Forty percent reported relying
on consultants to help design an SP process-in essence to provide the nuts and bolts of the "how to." Finally, 23% used consultants for formal documentation of the final plan. Thus,
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consultants were used for substantive, technical contributions
to the planning process. Less than one-fifth of the sample PVSOs
reported using consultants as facilitators-those persons skilled
in providing environments which stimulate contribution and
decision making. Facilitation was most often used in the initial
phase-Mission Analysis. However, only one-third of the organizations using facilitators credit use of facilitators as important to planning success.
The high degree of involvement (participation) by CEOs
throughout the planning process was shown in Table 2. A similar percentage of the responding organizations reported strong
CEO support (encouragement) for SP. Thus, the CEO role included equal doses of involvement and support. Since the majority of the questionnaires was completed by CEOs, the support
figure may be suspect. Thompson and Strickland (1983) suggest
that the most important task of management is direction setting
and argue, as does Steiner (1979), that CEOs have a responsibility to be involved deeply in SP processes. PVSO managers
apparently agree. In any case, CEOs are the most active actors
in the SP process, and appear to be shouldering much of the
responsibility for conducting SP within their organizations.
Decision Strategies
Ninety-one percent of the organizations reported using consensus as a basis for planning decision-making. The response
raises a number of conceptual issues regarding SP-DI orientations. Because 75% of the organizations indicated that SP helped
them resolve conflicts, it is not unlikely that consensus masks
a considerable measure of negotiation, persuasion, and even
confrontation to set the stage for the final consensual agreement.
However, an elitist, top-down planning process-the predominant mode in this sample-would suggest a higher probability
of achieving an early consensus than a planning process giving
equal weight to opinion from several hierarchical levels or horizontal constituencies. As suggested earlier, the DI model is most
closely associated with a consensus decision criterion. If agreement is reached because technical, non-political criteria are met,
a consensus strategy begins to shade into the strategies implied
in the SP model. However, because CEOs so overwhelmingly
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valued consensus as a decision strategy, it is probable that a
commitment to DI planning processes is carried over to SP
activities.
What Affects Planning Outcomes?
A final area of concern was the relationship, if any, between
planning process variations and the types of outcomes proposed
by the plan. The DI model is most closely associated with producing a recommended set of minor, incremental changes. The
SP model promises fundamental, major change outcomes. The
two outcomes, major or minor change, were defined by the
respondents. In those cases where the respondent concluded that
the plan proposed major changes, at least three of the following
were proposed: (a) change in mission; (b) addition of new service; (c) elimination of existing service; (d) change in staff;
(e) change in organization structure.
One-third of the PVSOs reported that their plans proposed
only minor changes; a similar percentage reported only major
change outcomes; 17% indicated both major and minor outcomes; and 10% indicated their plans proposed no changes for
agency operations. Clearly, SP is causing organizations to seriously challenge accepted ways of doing business since nearly
one-half of the agencies report major change outcomes. Additionally, failure to propose major changes does not necessarily
mean that the process was a failure because it is conceivable
that SP will affirm that existing goals are appropriate and should
be continued. However, failure to identify major changes during
the SP process does raise questions regarding the appropriateness of using a time-consuming, expensive process (SP) where
no change or only minor change outcomes result, as occurred
in almost half of the cases in this sample.
Table 3 indentifies the influence of SP planning process variations and organizational and market conditions associated with
plans that propose major changes for the organization. Forty
percent of the variance is explained. Completing all the required
tasks and the use of consultant expertise to develop planning
processes were positive influences. Widespread stakeholder participation, a carryover from the DI model, detracted somewhat
from securing major change recommendations. Neither a con-
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sensus strategy nor CEO involvement influenced outcome one
way or another.
While few of the organizational or market conditions were
related to the decision to adopt SP, several factors were associated with plans proposing major organizational changes. Size
is the only organizational characteristic predicting a major change
outcome. However, all but one of the market factors made a
difference in plan outcome. One of the important predictors defining a competitive arena, experiencing indirect competition,
was negatively associated with the achievement of major change.
All other market factors had a positive influence on a major
change result, confirming the hypothesis that changing market
conditions will influence the degree of organizational change.
Funders and affiliates believing so strongly in SP that they
are disposed to require its adoption can take comfort that an
external requirement produced plans promoting major change.
Organizations did not just "go through the motions" to satisfy
funders.
Conclusions
PVSOs are in a period of dramatic change. National commitments to deregulation, deinstitutionalization, and decentralization provide a climate in which organizations, though
operating in an increasingly competitive and risky environment,
have endless opportunities to add products and penetrate new
markets. Champions of strategic planning suggest that all organizations will benefit from developing a strategic plan and
that benefits are especially great for organizations experiencing
competitive conditions.
Although two-thirds of the large organizations (budgets over
$750,000) and one-third of the smaller organizations (under
$750,000) reported experiencing direct and/or indirect competition, that fact had little to do with a decision to use SP. The
overriding characteristic of those organizations developing a
strategic plan is that they are required/encouraged to do so.
Once an SP process was engaged, however, the organizations
generally adhered to SP model requirements with a considerable
steadfastness. The organizations most judiciously honoring the
"how to" manuals produced plans resulting in major changes.
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Table 3
Regression Analysis of FactorsAssociated With Plans That Propose
Major Changes
Dependent Variable = Major Changes Proposed by Plan
N = 88
Independent
Variables

b (unstandardized)

Fstat

R2 Change

PlanningProcess Variation
Completed all Tasks

.21

5.3*

.112

Used Consultant to
Develop Process

.31

12.4*

.045

-. 19

4.1*

.021

6.1*

.027

High Stakeholder
Participation
Contextual Factors

Organizational
Large agency

.22
Market Conditions

Pressure to Expand

.27

6.8*

.023

Pressures to Plan

.22

5.1*

.017

Pressure to Contract

.46

4.6*

.020

Perceive Others to be
Doing SP

.18

4.5*

.035

Conflict re
Growth/Cutback

.20

4.3*

.059

Increased Direct
Competition

.18

4.3*

.079

Changing Clients

.18

3.3*

.019

Increased Indirect
Competition

- .173

3.2*

.018

Constant -. 33, R Square .49, Adjusted R Square .40
*Significant at .05 level

Strategic Planning

Little attention has been focused on identifying the conditions suitable for SP use rather than incrementalist methods.
Although most of the publications addressing the merits of various planning models do incorporate or imply conditions in their
critiques, none claim comprehensiveness. Clearly SP is an expensive process, requiring a considerable investment of resources including time and money. If the process yields only
incremental adjustments, questions need to be raised about
whether SP is necessary.
From the perspective of the CEO, the implications are somewhat troublesome. If managers wish to propose major changes,
then this study suggests the planning process should be structured to assure that all SP tasks are attended to, that consultants
are used to assist in process design and analysis of the external
environment, and that broad participation be held to a minimum. Many CEOs are unaccustomed to methods for conducting
the External Audit task. The tendency has been to use general
forecasting techniques such as census analysis as substitutes for
more definitive market analyses. Until market analysis models
for PVSOs are developed, a productive analysis of environmental conditions (an SP requirement) will continue to be problematic for many PVSOs.
Finally, many CEOs in human service organizations have
been strongly influenced by human relations theorists who value
broad participation for, among other reasons, the probability
that plan implementation will be enhanced when those who
carry out the plans are involved in formulation. The finding
pointing to a negative relationship between broad participation
and a major change outcome may cause discomfort if managers
believe they must choose between the two goals of promoting
innovations and increasing stakeholder commitment to the organization. The dilemma can be somewhat tempered if managers are careful to identify the who, when, and why of
appropriate stakeholder participation in particular SP tasks rather
than assume an individual's participation is needed throughout
the process. Again, managers may choose to sequence the major
change/stakeholder commitment, using SP when major change
is needed and turning to an incremental analysis with broad
stakeholder involvement once the change is secured.
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There is no reason to believe that competitive forces will
wane. The more likely case is that competition will increase for
all PVSOs in both their capital and client markets. The risks
associated with changing organizational direction that may result from adopting SP methods must be evaluated in light of
risks of doing nothing different and relying on what worked in
the past.
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Challenging the Proposed
Deregulation of P.L. 94-142:
A Case Study of Citizen Advocacy
JAMES G. MCCULLAGH
University of Northern Iowa
Department of Social Work

Public Law 94-142, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, considered by many to be the most significant federal legislation for children in need of special education, was proposed for deregulation by the Reagan administration in 1982. This study examines
actions taken by citizen advocates-consumer/advocacy/parent(CAP)
organizationsand groups, parents, and other advocates for exceptional
children-who gave testimony in opposition to the proposed changes
at public hearings held by the United States Department of Education
in late 1982. The most controversial proposed rules were withdrawn
on September 29, 1982, while the remaining proposed changes were
not implemented. Citizen advocates' overwhelming presence at the
hearings and their other activities were instrumental in defeating the
administration'sefforts at deregulation.

Widely acknowledged as the most significant federal legislation for children in need of special education, P.L. 94-142, the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (1975), signified a
continuing commitment to maintain a major federal presence in
guaranteeing all children a right to a free appropriate public
education (Abeson & Zettel, 1977). Congress noted in the law
that of the "more than eight million handicapped children in the
United States . . .more than half ...do not receive appropriate
educational services . . .[and] one million of the handicapped
children . . . are excluded entirely from the public school system" (Sec. 3). Signed into law by President Ford on November 29, 1975, albeit reluctantly, final regulations were approved
in 1977, thus setting the stage for the nation's public schools to
open its doors to all children in the fall, 1978.
The proposed rules were published on August 4, 1982 (U.S.
Department of Education, 1982b), ending the long awaited and
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often delayed regulatory rewrite. The Council on Exceptional
Children (1982), for example, fearing that the "public comment
period will occur during the summer when the profession as
well as parents are away from their communication linkages",
urged its membership to send letters to Secretary Bell requesting
that hearings be held in the fall, 1982 (p. 1). The many national
human service and education organizations with headquarters
in or near Washington, D.C. had anticipated the proposed rules
and were especially alert and suspicious of the administration's
intent. Sensitivity had been heightened when Jack Anderson
(1982) had exposed the "bureaucratic bullies of the 'New Federalism' " and had drawn attention to Joe Beard, a lawyer in the
Department of Education's Office of the General Counsel, who
had devised a strategy to "divide the enemy" and "trick" Congress by submitting proposed rule changes for their consideration over an extended period.
Hamilton and Smith (1982) of the Children's Defense Fund,
in a letter to "Friends of Special Education", detailed how the
proposed revisions would have an adverse impact on children
in need of special education and related services. They indicated
that the proposed changes would
restrict parental rights and involvement, including elimination of
the current requirement of parental consent for preplacement evaluation and an initial placement; reduced requirements to ensure
parental participation at IEP meetings; elimination of parents' right
to open due process hearings to the public and to have access to
all evidence before a hearing; and authorization for educational
agencies to charge parents for a portion of the services a child
receives while placed in a residential program.
In addition, the Administration has proposed new restrictions
on related services; abolition of the timelines now mandated between determination of eligibility and IEP meeting, and removal
of the requirement that schools provide handicapped children with
a continuum of placements and services. Other changes include
deleting the requirement that a child be placed as dose as possible
to home; allowing administrators to circumvent the IEP process in
making crucial placement decisions in regard to disciplinary matters; and abandoning existing requirements that tests and evaluation materials be validated and administered by properly trained
personnel and that evaluation personnel attend the initial IEP
meeting (p. 1).

Citizen Advocacy

The proposed changes dramatically affected parents and their
children with special education needs, but they also impacted
school boards, teachers, administrators, related service providers, and numerous organizations who represented parents or
professional groups. Who then acted to speak against the proposed rules? The editors of The Exceptional Parent (Klein &
Schleifer, 1982a) could rightly take pride in their observation
that:
The power of individual parents, parent organizations, organizations of disabled people and other individuals and groups who are
advocates of people with disabilities has been dramatically evident
in the current proposed regulations change process (p. 16).
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to document the advocacy efforts of CAP organizations and groups, parents, and other citizen advocates who testified on behalf of handicapped children
at one of the eleven public hearings held by the United States
Department of Education. It was their time to be heard by then
Secretary Bell and the Reagan administration. Citizen advocates-CAP organizations, parents, and other concerned advocates-are a relatively new political force in advocating for a
strong federal presence in shaping educational policy. This group,
mobilized to engage the administration in a specifc, time-limited action, dominated the hearings.
This paper does not address the role of organizations representing school boards, related service professionals, provider
agencies, educators, administrators, other interested professionals nor representatives of public agencies or elected officials.
While a diversity of concerned organizations and agency personnel testified primarily against one or more proposed rules,
this paper is a case study of citizen advocacy to prevent the
deregulation of P.L. 94-142. It is an illustration of "individual
and broader-based efforts by members of the public to effect
changes in both the formulation of policies and their implementation" (Hudson, 1982, p. 109).
Federal Role in Special Education
The challenge to the federal role in special education was
evident. Advocates for a strong federal presence envisioned a
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return to state supremacy and a return to an earlier period when
many children were denied or received an inappropriate education. Klien and Schleifer (1982b), in anticipation of the proposed changes, expressed the dominant view voiced at the
hearings, when they asked their readers to "argue strongly for
continued federal presence in the area of compliance. The Federal
government must continue to monitor programs throughout the
country and cajole, encourage, or if necessary, require local leaders to obey the laws" (p. 10).
Congress held oversight hearings on August 10, 1982, in the
Senate (U.S. Congress. Senate, 1982) and in late September in
the House of Representatives (U.S. Congress. House, 1982). The
outrage felt by the Congress was best expressed when the House
Subcommittee on Select Education "unanimously adopted a resolution disapproving of the full set of proposed regulations"
(Hunter, 1982). Though a "lone vote was cast [by one House
member apparently] as a favor to the Administration" ("House
recall," 1982, p. 388), the message had been sent.
Senator Weicker, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the
Handicapped, related the "success story almost without parallel
in history" (U.S. Congress. Senate, 1982, p. 1) regarding what
the Act had accomplished for the formerly excluded, ignored,
and inadequately educated handicapped children. Senator
Weicker, however, in his opening statement on oversight of the
proposed regulatory changes, noted that "the only proposals we
have seen from this administration have sought to gut special
education" (p. 1). Senator Weicker recounted the administration's efforts to "decimate the law [P.L. 94-142] and to slash funding" and then questioned if the proposed changes were the
administration's attempt to "eliminate our Nation's system of
special education" (p. 2).
Some were concerned about excessive paperwork, an intrusive federal role in an area previously reserved for the states and
local communities, ambiguity of definition of terms, and increased involvement of schools in areas they believed were better left to community agencies. They saw an opportunity to
shape a return to more state and local control. The stage was set
for a dramatic confrontation which could shape the direction of
special education for decades to come.
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The Department of Education's Office of Special Education
(1981), consistent with President Reagan's January, 1981, Executive Order 12291, in a briefing paper, proposed that four general areas-definitions, grants administration, services,
procedural safeguards-comprising "16 sets of regulatory sections" (p. 1) become "targets of opportunity for deregulation"
(p. 1). Subsequently, the Department (1982b), in its notice of
proposed rulemaking, stressed then Secretary Bell's belief that
the proposed changes
will result in regulatory requirements which will adhere more
closely to the language of the statute and its legislative history. The
proposed regulations are designed: (1) To reduce fiscal and administrative burdens on recipients . . ., and (2) to address various
problems that have arisen in the implementation of the program
(p. 33836).
To juxtapose, one witness, after paraphrasing the above
mentioned statements, then went on to comment:
Many parents, educators and advocates would ask at this point,
and I quote, "Where do the needs of the child fit into the reasons
for the proposed regulations?" Or, perhaps the question should be,
"Are the proposed regulations addressing the children's needs, or
those of the system?"
The Department's (1982c) position on deregulation, a dominant theme that permeated the conflict which was voiced in
testimony at the hearings, was expressed by Shirley Jones, Special Education Programs. At the public hearing held in New
York at the World Trade Center on September 15, 1982, she stated
that the Department's definition of deregulation is the "act of
identifying highly prescriptive regulatory provisions, reducing
such burdens by eliminating or modifying those provisions and
whenever possible placing authority and responsibility at the
state or local level" (p. 8).
Review of Related Literature
Advocacy as a strategy to stand up for another was established as an active component of the arsenal of professional,
citizen, and provider organizations. Numerous books and pamphlets directed to citizen advocates had been written by 1982
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and detailed rights and advocacy strategies (e.g., Biklen, 1974;
Bowe & Williams, 1979; Children's Defense Fund, 1978, 1979;
Des Jardins, 1980a, 1980b; Fernandez, 1980; Turnbull & Turnbull, 1978; Weintraub, Abeson, Ballard, & LaVor, 1976). Parents
and professionals were well prepared when they came together
to advocate on behalf of children in need of special education
and related services.
Methods and Procedures
The Department of Education held public hearings in Washington, D.C. and ten regional sites to obtain public comment to
the proposed changes. The Department received over 30,000
written comments, including letters, petitions, and postcards.
The data source for this analysis was the written testimony of
the 1,426 witnesses. The testimony, on file with the Department
of Education, is a loose-leaf, bound multivolume set for each
public hearing.' The site, dates, and number who testified in
1982 follows: Washington, D.C., September 8-9, 114; Portland,
Maine, September 13-14, 161; Chicago, September 13-14, 163;
Atlanta, September 15-16, 117; New York, September 15-16,
118; Denver, September 20-21, 109; Los Angeles, September
20-21, 151; Seattle, September 22-23, 144; Dallas, September
22-23, 139; Philadelphia, October 4-6, 127; and Kansas City,
Kansas, October 5-6, 83.
Categorization of the 1,426 witnesses was difficult. Each
witness' testimony was coded by gender, parental status, and
special education classification of children (if applicable) and
type of representation (e.g., organization, profession, parent).
Witnesses who identified themselves as leaders in CAP organizations were coded without regard to professional (e.g., attorney) or employment status. Instead they were coded as follows:
(1) by scope of the organization-international, national, regional, state, local; (2) by highest leadership postion when representing two or more organizations at the same level (e.g., two
national organizations); and, when necessary, the organization
related to the type of child's disability. Finally, witnesses' general
position on the proposed changes were coded. Many who testified were parents of special education children, while also
holding leadership positions in one or more advocacy, profes-
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sional, and provider organizations or public agencies. They were
coded by organizational status. The information provided by the
witnesses is not always complete. For example, many did not
indicate parental status nor type of children in their care.
Findings
Witness Categories
The largest category of witnesses were those from organizations and groups that primarily represented children and adults
with various types of disabilities (36.5%). The next largest group
consisted of parents, including some who were lay advocates
(17%). Adults and children with disabilities, relatives of individuals with disabilities, and concerned citizens represented
almost 3%. School representation included state departments of
education (2.0%), school boards and associations (2.1%), teachers (2.6%), teacher associations and unions (2.5%), school administrators (4.3%) and associations (1.4%), related service
professionals (2.7%) and associations (6.5%), and other associations (1.7%). Provider agencies and associations (4.9 %), elected
officials (1.6%), university students (0.4%), and attorneys (2.2%)
also testified. Representatives from various state and local councils and offices (e.g., Office of the Handicapped, Protection and
Advocacy, Developmental Disabilities, P.L. 94-142 Advisory
Panel) accounted for 6.5%. Others who could not be identified
or classified into one of the above categories represented 2.2%
of those who testified.
Testimony
While almost all citizen advocates opposed the proposed
rules, testimony varied. Some advocates addressed each proposed change. Others addressed major points of contention. Still
others related personal horror experiences and the experiences
of others they knew as they detailed the need for services, the
lack of services, difficulties with school personnel, and fear of
loss of needed educational programs and necessary related services. Some shared positive experiences while expressing anger,
hurt, fear, and shock regarding impending loss. Often, the testimony was intensely personal. In addition, many witnesses
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spoke not only on behalf of their organization or organizations
but also as parents or relatives of exceptional children.
Certain themes or issues emerged during testimony which
underscored the objections of most. These witnesses testified to
the paramount importance of the federal government as a standard setting body and watchdog. The question of trust-or really
lack of trust-of the Reagan administration was raised continually. Regardless of the type of testimony almost all expressed
opposition: "I urge you to leave Public Law 94-142 alone"; "We
are opposed to the proposed regulations to PL 94-142 in their
entirety. We find them totally unacceptable and believe they
should be withdrawn completely".
Specific regulatory proposed changes most addressed by citizen avocates pertained to due process including prior notice
and parental consent thereby weakening parent involvement,
timelines and procedures for the development of an individualized educational plan (IEP), opportunity for children to be
placed in the least restrictive and most appropriate placement,
and accessibility to needed related services provided by qualified professionals. The right of children to a free appropriate
education with opportunity to become a meaningful and productive member of society was echoed in many forms. The specific objections to the proposed rules were numerous and cannot
be recounted here except to briefly touch on major issues. As
one witness testified
Even if the time frame permitted an itemized examination of the
proposed amendments, I would consider that inappropriate. Because to belabor the specifics is a little like complaining about
plugged up salt shakers on the Titanic.
Role of Federal Government. A national law applicable to all
children in all states with its provisions safeguarded by the federal government underlie the concerns of many witnesses. Some,
for example, gave specific expression to the importance of a federal presence:
Stability, reliability, is a scarce commodity to families of retarded and developmentally disabled citizens. The assumption of
a positive leadership role by our national government brought new
and immeasurable hope and promise of stability to our frightening
and uncertain world.
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We parents look to the federal government, through its laws
and regulations, to protect these children and to provide the statutory and regulatory framework with which state and local school
districts and agencies must comply in order to carry out their responsibilities to these young citizens.
Loosening federal requirements, rather than spurring states to
set and/or maintain their own specific standards, will instead result in a wholesale move to weaken the requirements of state laws
for full educational services for handicapped students.
The Reagan Administration is dedicated to ending the federal
government§ involvement in protecting the rights of the
handicapped.
Parent participation. Witnesses questioned the absence of
consumer involvement in the proposed changes. One contrasted
the proposed changes with the earlier 1977 implementing regulations. Another, for example, asked for meaningful representation of many groups to start all over again.
The 1977 regulations also boasted of the massive involvement
of community groups, parents associations and professionals in
writing the regulations. The 1982 proposed regulations are strangely
silent about consumer and community involvement in their
preparation.
I beg you to bum this document and start anew with a council
of knowledgeable representatives chosen by members of the following groups....
Welfare Dependency. The possibility of inadequate or no educational programming coupled with the awareness of what the
lack of educational opportunity was like prior to 1975 made parents and advocates painfully aware of the possible dependence
of children and later youth and adults on family, welfare and
institutions. Parents stated:
I didn't ask for this job. I was given it. And all I want out of
anything is for my son to be a functioning member of society, not
in a welfare line waiting for a handout.
What it going to cost to institutionalize my son when I'm not
around to take care of him anymore because he didn't have an
education, and education that he is entitled to now?
Fear,Frustration,Fight. Parents clearly expressed their anger,
fear, and frustration with the "system" and they also dearly in-
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dicated their willingness to fight. They believed they had little
to lose by standing up to the Reagan administration, and everything-their child's right to an education-to gain. And they
did express themselves:
It my entire life that's on the line, and I'm a little nervous.
I'm the parent of a multiply-handicapped son.
We have no where else to go and no more important cause
than to fight the administration each step of the way.
I'm scared. You back me into a comer, and the only thing I
know to do is try to fight my way out, and thats what I feel now.
CAP Organizations
Many national organizations with state and local affiliates,
state organizations, local groups, and coalition groups came together to defeat the proposed rules. CAP representation, constituting the largest category of witnesses, was a major force at
the 11 public hearings. Table 1 lists organizations or groups by
disability. Advocacy, parent, and some groups in the "other"
category were not specific to a particular disability. Some organizations who had representatives at the hearings are listed
in Appendix 1.
One CAP organization, for example, the Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC), was represented by at least 9% of those
who gave testimony. ARC's Action Alert (1982) called for a "massive response from ARC'ers . . . to secure changes in the rules"
(p. 1). In addition to the need for generating "thousands and
more thousands of written comments" (p. 1), ARC stressed the
importance of a "huge turnout" (p. 2) at each hearing. ARC's
plea continued:
Please make every attempt to attend the hearings. We hope that so
many individuals and organizations will seek to testify that there
will not be enough time to hear all witnesses. In that case, media
attention will be enhanced and an excellent opportunity for good
publicity against the proposed rules will become available. Each
should plan to bring busloads to the regional hearing nearest you.
(p. 2)
The Action Alert also included an "initial analysis" of the proposed changes. The Alert informed and educated and then called
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Table 1
Representation of Advocacy Groups by Disability
Disability
Mental Retardation
Learning disabilities
Autism
Disabilities
Cerebral Palsy
Persons with Handicaps
Blind/Visual Impairment
Deaf/Hearing Impairment
Spina Bifida
Mental Health
Physical Handicaps
Severe Handicaps
Parent groups
Advocacy
Other
Total

Local*

Number of Groups
State National # Total Female

74
18
13
15
12
7
10
11
2
4
2
1
92
5
2

52
35
15
13
12
16
7
7
2
5
5
1
13
5
4

268

192

9
7
5
4
4
4
7
5
7
1
0
4
0
1
2
60

135
60
33
32
28
27
24
23
11
10
7
6
105
11
8
520

Male

86
50
26
16
19
20
15
13
4
9
5
5
84
10
7

49
10
7
16
9
7
9
10
7
1
2
1
21
1
1

369

151

*Includes members.
#Includes regional and international representatives.

on its leaders and members to act. The ARCs activities have
been described in detail to illustrate how effective one national
organization with state and local chapters consisting of thousands of members can be in opposing changes that are detrimental to its membership. Similarly, numerous other
organizations were sending memoranda, alerts, and letters to
its membership with calls for action.
Parent Groups and Coalitions. The diversity of parent groups,
coalitions, and combined parent and professional organizations,
councils, and groups that spoke against the proposed changes
included state and local coalitions, parent-teacher groups, local
advisory councils, parent support groups, parent advocacy
groups, task forces on special education groups, and school parent groups. These groups included the Oregon Coalition to Save
Special Education, "a group of parents, educators, professionals,
consumers and advocates committed to maintaining without re-
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vision the current Public Law 94-142 regulations"; Philadelphia
Coalition for Equality Special Education, "counsel of a number
of advocacy groups"; Washington State Special Education Coalition, "representatives of 31 organizations, parents and professionals, who share a common concern about the quality of
education for handicapped students"; Promise, ""a statewide
coalition of organizations and individuals concerned with special education in Virginia"; Caddo Parish Special Education Advisory Council, mandated by state law in Louisiana; Mt. Diablo
Unified School District's Community Advisory Committee for
Special Education, "a state mandated group of parents ... designated under California's Master Plan"; and, Parents Advocating for the Handicapped (PATH), "a newly-formed group in ...
Tennessee. . . . [because] there have been many children receiving inappropriate, inadequate programs and some receiving
no programs at all."
Parents
At least 41% of those who testified were parents of children
with handicaps. Only 4% stated they were not parents. The
remainder did not indicate parental status. Just 466 of the 583
who stated they were parents indicated their child's specific
handicap. Some had two or more children with handicaps. Most
were children with mental retardation (33%), followed by children with learning disabilities (19%), multiple handicaps (8%),
autism (8%), hearing impairments (6%), cerebral palsy (6%),
severe handicaps (5%), visual handicaps (4%), deafness/blindness (4%), and physical disabilities (4%).
Parents who did not represent any organization comprised
17% of those who testified. Almost all were biological parents,
while a few were foster, adoptive, or surrogate parents. Some
parents also identified themselves as lay advocates. Most were
female (80%). Almost all parents indicated opposition to the
proposed changes, while most instisted on complete withdrawal
of the proposed rules. A few selected statements from parents'
testimony may suggest the strength and intensity of feeling and
expression: "It is near-criminal if any changes occur in
P.L. 94-142"; "Do not regulate or loosen the reins, but, rather,
strengthen these laws. Implement these laws".
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Concerned Citizens
Adults and children with disabilities (27), relatives of individuals with disabilities (8), concerned citizens (7), and university students (7) also testified. At least 45 witnesses identified
themselves as having disabilities, but most were classified under
other categories. Some excerpts from relatives may reflect the
concern expressed at these hearings. A grandmother stated: "I
don't think that Washington always knows what the average
human being has to go through. At the local level, we're going
to have school districts that's not going to do nothing." A sister
who has two brothers with handicaps commented: "I wish that
all school districts would obey the law, but even I know they
don't. And unless it's written down what they have to do they
won't do it." A 12-year-old boy whose brother has mental retardation spoke against changes in related services because of
his fear that the speech services which his brother "needs on a
daily basis" would be limited. The potential pain resulting from
the imminent loss of necessary education and related services
was evident as relatives and others cited example after example
of the present and future gains for children brought about by
the law and current regulations.
Discussion
CAP organizations as well as related service professional
associations, state departments of education and a variety of
state councils, and school boards and associations were informed of the impending changes. They alerted and then mobilized leadership at the state and local levels, while reaching
out to its membership and consumers of special education and
related services. Mobilization was dramatic. Many perhaps became involved for the first time. For others the fight was a continuing struggle which had begun with their entry into advocacy
efforts because essential educational opportunities had not been
available for their children. This brief mobilization of thousands, led by national and state organizations, reaffirmed the
right to appropriate education for those children who had been
denied such an education or served inadequately by local and
state public education programs.
The message to save P.L. 94-142 was not only directed at the
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Department of Education but also aimed at the Congress, the
President, and state officials. CAP organizations-from the national to the local, from the newly formed to the long-standing,
from those with memberships of dozens to those of thousands,
from those with no budget nor membership dues to groups
with large budgets and many staff-rallied to defeat the proposed changes. These organizations represented untold numbers of exceptional children and adults. The actual number of
persons directly and indirectly involved, including those who
signed petitions, may never be known. This issue may have
mobilized more parents and CAP organizations than any other
issue in the field of special education.
The most controversial proposed rules were withdrawn on
September 29, 1982, by the Education Secretary Terrell Bell (U.S.
Department of Education, 1982a); the remaining proposals died
a quiet death in the Department of Education ("ED abandons,"
1982). Secretary Bell acknowledged the outpouring of protest by
parents and especially mothers who acted by writing letters,
gathering signatures on petitions, and testifying at the scheduled
public hearings. The Director and Assistant to the Director of
Special Education Programs, Department of Education (Sontag
& Button, 1982) noted that the "written comments and the information presented at the public hearing ...represented nearly
unanimous disapproval of several positions proposed by the
Department" (p. 13) which led to Secretary Bell's decision.
Parents and children had much to lose-a free, appropriate
public education and necessary related services. Professionals
who provide related services could have been stricken from the
new regulations while services could have been drastically reduced. Jobs for many in the field of education could have been
eliminated. The federal government's role, and particularly the
Congressional role, in education would have been curtailed. If
the Reagan administration had been successful in this effort,
other initiatives to reduce the federal presence and increase state
responsibility would have been forthcoming. It was a test of
political power. The intent to divide and conquer the enemy,
espoused by Joe Beard, a departmental attorney, did not succeed.
Local, state and national CAP organizations and coalitions,
many organized by disability, represented groups who had been
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denied adequate public education prior to the historic passage
of P.L. 94-142. The CAP groups of the 1970s and 1980s have
learned that
politics affects in one way or another almost everything that happens to exceptional children, that individually or together people
can affect political events, and that unless more people become
involved it may be doubtful that the goals of educating all exceptional children will be achieved (LaVor, 1976, p. 259).
Perhaps this case study of citizen advocacy-CAP organizations, parents, and friends of the handicapped-has demonstrated Hudson's (1982) belief "that the greater the volume and
intensity of citizen advocacy, the greater the likelihood that positive program outcomes will follow" (p. 120). Citizen advocates
were ready; they were involved, voiced strong opposition, and
they made a difference. The educational rights and resources so
desperately needed by so many exceptional children had been
saved by an outpouring of protest against cutting back services
to this special and vulnerable constituency.
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Appendix
List of Selected OrganizationsRepresented at the Public Hearings
Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf
American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities
American Foundation for the Blind
Arthritis Foundation
Association for Children and Adults with Learning Disabilities
Association for Retarded Citizens
Association for the Blind and Visually Impaired
Association for the Rights of Children with Handicaps
Association for the Severely Handicapped
Coordinating Council for Handicapped Children
Cornelia de Lange Syndrome Foundation
Council for Children with Mental Disorders
Downs Syndrome Congress
Epilepsy Foundation of America
International Association of Parents of the Deaf
International Institute for Learning Disabilities
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
National Association for Down's Syndrome
National Association for the Parents of the Visually Impaired
National Association of the Deaf
National Easter Seal Society
National Federation of the Blind
National Network of Learning Disabled Adults
National Society for Autistic Children
National Society for Children and Adults with Autism
National Society for the Deaf
Spina Bifida Association of America
United Cerebral Palsy Associations
Women with Disabilities United
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Recently, the courts have recognized the right to a minimum level of
mental health treatment for individuals confined in both mental and
correctionalinstitutions, utilizing a different rationale for each system.
As mental health administratorsin state mental hospitals accepted that
they were responsiblefor providing an increased level of mental health
services, they were disappointed that courts had subsequently ruled
that individuals in state hospitals had a right to refuse treatment. The
purpose of this paper is to elaborate, sociologically and legally, upon
treatment refusal in the correctionalsystem since most of the attention
on treatment refusal has focused on individuals in state mental hospitals
and since the legal status of inmates in correctionalsystems is different.
An anlysis of the literature revealed that inmates in correctionalinstitutions, similar to individuals in the state hospital system, have a limited constitutional right to refuse mental health treatment, and this
right is unlimited when the treatment provided is considered by the
courts to be in fact punishment.

Within the last twenty years there has been a steady development of case laws supporting the right to treatment for persons confined primarily in mental institutions (Johnson v.
Solomon, 1979; Rouse v. Cameron, 1966; Scott v. Plante, 1981;
State in the Interest of R.G.W., 1976; Welsch v. Likins, 1974), and

some professionals have argued that, under appropriate circumstances, there is a right to mental health treatment for inmates
confined in correctional institutions as well (Alexander, 1987b;
Brenner & Galanti, 1985). As a result of this newly established
right, institutions, both mental and correctional, had to
strengthen their treatment services to inmates. About the time
that significant changes were being made, there began the as-
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sertion, much to the chagrin of mental health professionals, that
institutional mental health recipients had the right to refuse
treatment. Psychologists and psychiatrists lamented that it is
impossible to have a right to treatment and at the same time
also have the right to refuse treatment (Hassenfeld & Grumet,
1984). Yet, advocates for inmates insist that some mental health
treatments (i.e., psychotropic drugs, psychosurgery, aversive
therapy) cause irreversible bodily damages (Herr, Arons, & Wallace, 1983) or in the case of correctional inmates are in fact punishment in disguise. When this is the case, there is a right to
refuse treatment. Given that there is a right to refuse treatment
for individuals in state mental hospitals (Beis, 1984; Bonnie,
1982; Brant, 1984; Brotman, 1982; Hoge, Gutheil, & Kaplan, 1987;
Norris, Carroll, & Watson, 1980; Plotin, 1978; R.M.R., 1981),
there practically should be the right to refuse treatment for inmates in correctional institutions. The purpose of this paper is
to explain the right to refuse mental health treatment for inmates
confined in correctional institutions. Admittedly, case laws arising from the mental health and correctional fields tend to be
separate and distinct bodies of law (Churgin, 1983). But the
United States Supreme Court has indicated that felons do not
automatically lose all of their rights, and the Constitution, albeit
hesitantly, follows them behind the walls of the penitentiary
(Pell v. Procunier, 1973). The elaboration of the right to refuse
mental health treatment, defined here as that treatment which
is designed to alter the behavior or mental functioning of a prisoner, will be done from both sociological and legal perspectives.
The Right to Mental Health Treatment
Before discussing the right to refuse treatment in a correctional institution, there needs to be an illumination of how the
right to treatment developed in the first place.
Recognition of the right to treatment was first announced in
1966 when Judge Bazelon ruled that a man institutionalized for
four years in a mental hospital had a statutory and constitutional
right to treatment (Rouse v. Cameron, 1966). Finding treatment
in Alabama state mental hospitals superficial, Judge Johnson
wrote that "to deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the
altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic
reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the
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very fundamentals of due process" (Johnson v. Solomon, 1979,
p. 279). One state court ruling in a case involving a juvenile that
had implications for the mental health system stated that "when
mental patients are committed for treatment purposes they unquestionably [emphasis added] have a constitutionally reinforced
right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of
them the realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or
her mental condition" (State in Interest of R.G.W., 1976, p. 1376).
In these cases the courts were simply saying that if a person's
liberty is taken away for the purposes of treatment, then that
person had a constitutional right to treatment. Subsumed in this
argument is the acknowledgement that a quid pro quo tacit
agreement arises between the state and the individual. That is
to say, the state takes something from the individual (his or her
freedom) and thus owes to that individual something of value
(treatment). When treatment is nonexistent, the person's constitutional right to due process has been violated.
In the matter of convicted offenders, the right to treatment
is medically based. Courts have held that the denial of medical
care to an inmate while imprisoned is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
(Estelle v. Gamble, 1976; Medcalf v. State of Kansas, 1970). Taking
this lead, other courts have ruled that the right to medical care
includes both physical and mental illnesses (Bowring v. Godwin,
1977; Rogers v. Evans, 1986; Ruiz v. Estelle, 1980). In a Texas case
in which the entire prison system was held to be unconstitutional, a federal judge restated the right to minimally adequate
mental health treatment in a prison setting and reaffirmed that
"a prison inmate is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or mental health care provider, exercising
ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes
with reasonable medical certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease
or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that
the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the
denial of care would be substantial" (Ruiz v. Estelle, 1980, p. 106).
Sociological Discussion of The Right to Refuse Treatment
One of the essential concerns of sociology is social control.
In its infancy, sociology understood social control as societal
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responses for managing members of society. Later, sociology
began to conceptualize social control more concisely as the control of deviant behaviors and the promotion of conformity (Conrad & Schneider, 1980). There is a consensus among most
members of society that without social control, society will
quickly disintegrate into chaos (Cockerham, 1981). Generally,
the institutions that helped to maintain social control primarily
were the family and the church. Scheff (1984), further, contended
that social control operates internally and externally to mold individuals' behaviors, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. Sanctions to nonconformists by social control agents for
nonconformity are applied inconsistently and are sometimes negotiable. Scheff also said that societal reaction to deviance is
usually in excess to what is actually needed. Sensitive to this
framework, studies of crime, delinquency, and mental illness
sought to explain deviancy but equally important sought to explain the societal reactions to deviancy. Consequently, dependent variables that measure the severity of societal response are
of central interest to investigators.
From a sociological perspective, mental illness is viewed as
a social status and not a disease. The evidence for this view
comes from studies which have shown how prevalent the symptoms of mental illness are in the general community and how
imprecise the defining symptoms are. Moreover, the status of
being mentally ill is ascribed by the societal reaction and not
really achieved by the person designated as mentally ill (Scheff,
1984; Shah, 1980). The issue of social control of the mentally ill
perturbs some professionals because of the imprecision of psychiatric diagnosis. Physicians specializing in internal medicine
can generally reach consensus on diagnosis of a heart attack,
appendicitis, or kidney failure, but mental health problems do
not present for psychiatrists a concrete set of symptoms for diagnosis that will lead to a consensus of what the problem is.
Oftentimes, it is the subjective opinion of the psychiatrists that
is the determining factor in labeling one as mentally ill (Cockerham, 1981). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), of
course, has helped to eliminate some of the subjectivity in psychiatric diagnosis, but vagueness of symptoms is still a problem.
For example, as a neophyte social work intern in a psychiatric
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unit of a major teaching hospital in Houston, Texas for indigent
citizens, the author observed a psychiatrist explaining to a medical student why a woman he had examined deserved a particular diagnosis. The psychiatrist, in accordance with the DSM IIn,
emphasized one criterion in the diagnosis as impulsiveness,
which was determined by family reports that the woman had
recently gone shopping and bought ten dresses. However, affluent people frequently buy clothing in bundance. This is an example of why sociologists, such as Lemert and Becker, believe
that the symptoms of mental illness are imprecise and vague.
Despite these imprecisions, Conrad and Schneider (1980)
averred that "medicine, especially psychiatry, has replaced religion as the most powerful extralegal institution of social control" (p. 241). Medical social control seeks to minimize, eliminate,
or normalize deviant behavior. If something is defined as a
psychic illness, it automatically becomes within the province of
psychiatry to cure regardless of the efficaciousness of its intervention. At the same time, Conrad and Schneider suggest that
there are positive benefits to the medicalization of deviance,
such as viewing alcoholism or mental illness humanitarianly.
However, they identified seven negative byproducts. These are:
(1) dislocation of responsibility; (2) assumption of the moral
neutrality of medicine; (3) domination of expert control;
(4) medical social control; (5) individualization of social problems; (6) depoliticization of deviant behavior; and (7) exclusion
of evil (Conrad & Schneider, 1980).
Turning to the correctional institution, Waldron stated that
modern correctional organizations' two essential functions are
treatment and custody or control. The custody or control function of a correctional institution refers to establishing secure
housing, safety for the staff and inmates, and a controlled environment. To be sure, some treatment activities, such as classification, also serve a custody and control function. Imperative
to the control function is the establishment of rules for inmates
to follow. Waldron, in addition, wrote that "although most of
these rules are legitimate requirements for maintaining control,
in some prisons and jail situations they are also used as a means
of repression and punishment in the mistaken belief that control
demands complete regimentation in all areas of prison life"
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(Waldron, 1984, p. 371). On the other hand, Nassi argued that
despite the manifest goal by some states that imprisonment is
in part for rehabilitation or treatment, the overriding goal is
always the punishment of the offender. As a consequence, prison
psychologists and psychiatrists compromise precepts derived
from their professional training in order "to be consonant with
the punitive function of the prison." Moreover, Nassi indicated
that "to the extent that psychiatrists and psychologists adhere
to the precepts of their profession, they will have to adjust these
precepts to function in harmony with the physical and social
environment of the prison. Alternatively, they may attempt to
reconstitute the organization and redirect its goals so that they
are more consonant with their belief system. However, to the
extent that the individual adjusts to the prison regime and alters
the professional orientation, this orientation may become so distorted that it does not even resemble the traditions of his discipline. It is in this way that treatment becomes indistinguishable
from punishments, except by name" (Nassi, 1980 p. 327).
As a matter of fact, most inmates are diagnosed as having
a character or personality disorder. Mental health professionals
believe that these inmates have accepted values that are contrary
to the dominant society. Generally, the inmates are hostile and
suspicious and feel that there is nothing wrong with their behavior (Silber, 1980). By way of illustration, inmates from one
Georgia prison, who probably were thought by psychologists to
have personality disorders, refused at one time to participate in
their treatment because the feeling was that the mental health
unit was an instrument of the prison administration to wage
psychological warfare against them. For some mental health officials this view may be evidence of paranoia, but the possibility
exists also that this view may be accurate and represents one of
the tools of institutional social control. Alternatively, it could be
an illustration of conflict between institutional and inmates' goals.
Halleck wrote insightfully about this conflict when he said:
The conflict between the interest of society and the interest of the
individual offender can be illustrated most powerfully by considering the "political prisoner". Some men violate the law out of
conscience or as part of a deliberate effort to change the society.
If we "rehabilitated" these men and trained them to behave in a
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manner which the mass of citizens might find desirable, we would
be negating their freedom to dissent and depriving the society of
one important channel for social change. Consider, for example,
the impact on our society if our prisons had succeeded in rehabilitating such convicted offenders as Henry Thoreau, Eugene Debs,
Martin Luther King, or Malcolm X. [To this list could be added the
Honorable Elijah Muhammed who went to prison for refusing to
serve in the armed services and later built the Nation of Islam and
the Berrigan Brothers who were jailed for activities protesting the
Vietnam War.] These examples dramatize that the issue of rehabilitation must be considered not only in terms of our capacity to
change human behavior but also in terms of under what circumstances and to what extent we should be allowed to do so (Halleck,
1980, p. 337).
This represents an example of one of Conrad and Schneider's
concerns that medical social control could facilitate the depoliticization of deviant behavior. Offenders, as a practical matter,
are sent to prison as punishment for violating criminal statutes.
Hence, the loss of liberty for a specific period is the prescribed
punishment, and one could assert that any attempt to take away
what one believes is beyond the statutory requirement (Vetter
& Rieber, 1980) and an issue for litigation.
Legality of The Right To Refuse Treatment
Sharipo (1974) theorized that the first Amendment to the
United States Constitution "protects a person's power to generate
thoughts, ideas, and mental activity." He called this protection
a person's freedom of mentation and based it on the following
analysis: (1) The First Amendment protects communication of
virtually all kinds, whether in writing, verbal, pictorial or any
symbolic form, and whether cognitive or emotive in nature;
(2) Communication entails the transmission and reception of
whatever is communicated; (3) Transmission and reception necessarily involve mentation on the part of both the person transmitting and the person receiving; (4) It is in fact impossible to
distinguish in advance mentation which will be involved in or
necessary to transmission and reception from mentation which
will not; (5) If communication is to be protected, all mentation
regardless of its potential involvement in transmission or rejec-
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tion must therefore be protected. Having established the basis
for the protection of mentation, Shapiro posited that as a corollary the next two propositions form a right to be free from
coercive organic therapies: (6) Organic therapy intrusively alters
or interferes with mentation; and (7) The First Amendment
therefore protects persons against enforced alteration or interference with their mentation by coerced organic therapy. It appears that there has been some recognition of First Amendment
violation when drugs are administered against an individual's
will (Shavill, 1981; Torrey, 1983), and some court decisions have
recognized a limited right to refuse treatment in the absence of
an emergency (Brooks, 1980; Brotman, 1982).
Seeing it a little differently, Beyer theorized that individuals
have two types of freedom-freedom to and freedom from. He
believes, for example, that "freedom to tattoo one's body involves a freedom from state constraints upon tattooing; freedom
from compulsory state tattoos involves a freedom to keep one's
body untatooed. Yet there remains an important conceptual distinction between freedom to tattoo oneself if one wants and
freedom from the state compelling one to be tattooed if one does
not. Freedom to (tattoo oneself, have an abortion, smoke marijuana) may conveniently be called autonomy, freedom from
(compulsory tattoos, police searches of the rectum, unwanted
blood transfusions) may conveniently be called integrity. When
one wants to tattoo oneself and the state will not let one, autonomy is abridged by a state constraint; when the state tattoos one
against one's will, integrity is invaded by a state compulsion"
(Beyer, 1980, p. 502).
Others have recognized the right to refuse treatment based
on the longstanding practice of informed consent as a prerequisite to treatment. At common law, any medical procedure that
is not consented to by a person is a battery. Broadening the
concept of consent, the court established the principle of informed consent. Informed consent not only requires that a person consent to a medical procedure but the person must be given
information on the possible risks and likely benefits. Additionally, the person must be told of alternative procedures, if any.
The reason for these explanations to a person is to respect his
or her right to autonomy or self-determination (Rodenhauser,
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1984). Granted, a doctor possesses more knowledge than a lay
person but the final treatment decision must lie with the individual (Annas, Glantz, & Katz, 1977; Rhoden, 1980; R.M.R.,
1981). Everyone has a fundamental right to determine to be
helped or left alone-the right to privacy (Middleton, 1980).
Even if the person's death is impending, an individual still has
the right to refuse treatment (Schwitzgebel, 1979).
Although most mental health professionals now concede that
there is a right to refuse treatment in a state mental hospital,
they know as a result of Rennie v. Klein and Rogers v. Orkin that
this right is limited as it can be overridden with procedural
safeguards in place. That means that the refusing patient must
have an independent review, assessment of the risks and benefits, perhaps involvement of an advocacy group, and an appeal
process (Parry, 1984).
The rationale for the right to refuse treatment is different
depending if a person is institutionalized based on parens patriae (intervening for the protection of the individual) or police
power (intervening for the protection of society). The state's authority to intervene under parens patriae assumes that the person is incompetent to give informed consent or refused treatment.
In the absence of competency, the state can force treatment if it
is believed to be in the best interest of the individual and if less
restrictive therapies are unsuitable. On the other hand, persons
institutionalized because of police powers are not assumed to
be incompetent and their mere confinement neutralizes their
threat to the community (Wexler, 1976). Therefore, a person who
is competent to make treatment decisions who is institutionalized under police powers has a stronger basis for refusing treatment than one has who has been institutionalized under parens
patriae and is deemed incompetent. Unlike mental hospitals
which have both individuals committed under parens patriae
and police powers, all correctional inmates are institutionalized
under police powers because they have been convicted of crimes
against society.
The Right To Refuse in a Correctional Setting
Most of the above discussions referred to individuals institutionalized in mental hospitals. However, there are implications
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for inmates incarcerated in correctional institutions. In 1973 the
United States Supreme Court affirmed that prisoners retain all
rights enjoyed by free citizens except those necessarily lost as
an incident of confinement (Pell v. Procunier,1973). What is considered an incident of confinement is the recognition by the legal
system of valid penal objectives of deterrence (specific and general), rehabilitation, and institutional security (Pugh v. Locke,
1971). As a result, rights which do not interfere or clash with
these objectives are kept by inmates. As a specific example, a
federal appeals court ruled the dual commitment procedure in
New York state as illegal because a person convicted under a
criminal statute was entitled to the same rights that a civilian
enjoys (Schuster v. Harold, 1969).
Initially, the right to refuse treatment emerged from the
criminal justice system. Lawsuits initiated by individuals judged
incompetent to stand trial, judged insane, and convicted under
the general penal statutes reached the courts alleging that they
were subjected to abusive "treatment" (Shobat, 1985). For example, an inmate of a New York prison system who accused the
administration of being corrupt in 1941 was diagnosed as paranoid and transferred to the Dannemora State Hospital For The
Criminally Insane for an unspecified period although he was
close to serving his original sentence. In 1969, a federal court
ruled in his favor and said in effect that his treatment had to
end (Talbott & Kaplan, 1983).
Further, it is not uncommon for prison officials to use drugs
as a means of social control. Mattocks and Jew researched aversive therapy on California prisoners in 1967 and wrote glowingly
of its efficacy. They suggested that innumerable assaults, stabbings, self-mutilations, and suicidal attempts probably were reduced by the use of Anectine, a drug used in aversive treatment,
and that 57 percent of the treated prisoners were able to get
further treatment in a psychiatric unit or suitable for transfer to
other prisons for "programming" (Mattocks & Jew, 1982). The
court began to look at aversive therapy and found programs in
California and Iowa in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (Knecht v. Gillman, 1973; Mackey v. Procunier, 1973; Shapiro, 1974). Labeling
a practice treatment does not bar scrutiny to determine if it is
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in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. It is the intent, the actual procedure,
and the results that are important, not whether the state calls a
practice treatment instead of punishment (Schwitzgebel, 1979).
The court noted in the Iowa case that "whether it [the treatment]
is called aversive stimuli or punishment, the act of forcing someone to vomit for a fifteen minute period for committing some
minor breach of the rules can only be regarded as cruel and
unusual unless the treatment is being administered to a patient
who knowingly and intelligently has consented to it" (Knecht
v. Gillman, 1973, p. 1140). Implied in this decision is the right
to refuse treatment.
Correctional treatment which is designed to change the mind
of thought processes of inmates can be rightfully refused as
being violative of their right to free speech. Recent case laws
have established the right to "mind freedom" and "privacy of
the mind." There is a fundamental right of people to be secure
in their private thoughts. Ordinarily, courts are reluctant to interfere with this right unless the state advances a compelling
interest (Vetter & Rieber, 1980). Thus, the right of an individual
to have, for instance, delusional thoughts is protected from alteration by the state. To comprehend this principle it is important to understand that many delusional thoughts are not harmful
to the state or the individual. An inmate who believes he is
Jesus or has thoughts, realistic or unrealistic, of grandeur is not
threatening to institutional order, and it would be difficult for
the state to persuasively argue that a compelling state interest
exists in seeking to alter such thoughts.
In Rummels v. Rosendale the issue was a purely medical issue
but had implication for mental health. In this case, Rummels
was operated on for a hemorrhoidectomy against his will. The
court ruled that "allegations that prison medical personnel performed major surgical procedures upon the body of an inmate,
without his consent and over his known objection, that were
not required to preserve his life or further a compelling interest
of imprisonment or prison security, may foreshadow proof of
conduct violative of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
sufficient to justify judgment under the Civil Rights Act" (Rummels v. Rosendale, 1974, p. 735). In a later case a man named
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Scott was held incompetent to stand trial in 1954 and also was
held to be mentally incompetent. Scott began habeas corpus
action claiming that he was forced to take drugs and treatment
against his will. The court suggested that in the absence of an
emergency unconsented treatment of a drug that affects the mind
is a tort and actionable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Scott v.
Plante, 1976).
Besides psychotropic drugs, the state possesses a wide array
of medical tools, such as electrical stimulations of the brain by
implantation of electrodes, psychosurgery, and organic conditioning techniques, with which to control the behavior of inmates in both correctional and mental institutions. Use of
psychotropic drugs can alleviate the symptoms of mental illness,
but the misuse of them, as well as the other interventions, foreshadows an abridgement of personal freedom for inmates (Shapiro, 1973).
The United States Supreme Court examined the transfer of
a Nebraska prisoner to a mental hospital and ruled that Vitek
had a right to a hearing because of the substantial change in
condition of a transfer to a mental hospital. The court wrote
"While a conviction and sentence extinguish an individual right
to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, they do
not authorize the state to classify him as mentally ill and to subject
him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him
additional due process protections. Here, the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to
mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness,
constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections .... Although the state's interest in segregating
and treating mentally ill patients is strong, the prisoner's interest
in not being arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to
unwelcomed treatment [emphasis added] is also powerful, and the
risk of error in making the determinations . . .is substantial enough
to warrant appropriate procedural safeguards against error" (Vitek v. Jones, 1979, p. 481).
While the court did not specifically say that Vitek had an absolute right to refuse treatment, there are fairly strong references
that a prisoner could not be capriciously treated against his will.
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For example, some of the procedural requirements for a Vitek
hearing are the opportunity for the inmate to present witnesses
in his or her behalf, to crossexamine state witnesses, and to
have an independent decision maker. These safeguards suggest
that an inmate has the right to refuse treatment that is not in
his or her best interest. Having the right to challenge state witnesses and the right to an independent decision maker will stop
unnecessary treatment decisions. Hence, there is a latent pronouncement of a right to refuse or reject treatment that is unwarranted in this decision.
Similarly, another federal court ruled that the Federal Bureau
of Prison's START (Special Treatment and Rehabilitation Training) program was reviewable as possibly being violative of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment despite the assertion of the prison officials that the program was treatment. START consisted of placing problem inmates
on a level system with just the bare essentials and allowing them
to move up depending upon improved behavior. However, some
critics charged that the initial level of deprivation was too low
and unconstitutional. The issue became moot when the program
was terminated and the court did not make a ruling (Clone v.
Richardson, 1974). Like aversive therapy, the START program
could be reasonably construed as being punishment and subject
to the test of whether it was cruel and unusual punishment.
Similar to their counterparts in state mental hospitals, prisoners have a limited right to refuse treatment which can be
overridden. For instance, at the Federal Medical Center at Rochester, prisoners who are transferred there for psychiatric treatment are sent back to their sending institutions if they refuse
treatment. However, if it is determined that the prisoner is dangerous to himself or others, he can be forcibly treated following
an adverse ruling from a hearing at the institution before a federal magistrate. In like manner, the Oak Park Heights Correctional Institution has a mental health unit that is responsible for
treating all of the mentally ill male offenders in the Minnesota
system. By statute, it has the authority to forcibly treat a psychotic inmate following a hearing before a judge (Alexander,
1987a). Hence, one can see similar types of safeguard procedures
in the prison system that exist in the mental health system.
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Conclusion
The essential focus of this paper was the elaboration of the
right to refuse mental health treatment in correctional institutions. This is an essential right given that the dominant penal
philosophy is to punish offenders and given that medical technology may discover more effective behavior controlling drugs
or innovations. It is quite easy for institutional treatment officials to stray, as some examples in this paper have shown, from
their helping philosophy and adopt practices that are punishing.
Perhaps, this is an inevitability given the environment of a total
institution. It must be remembered that antipsychotic drugs,
which sound helpful, do not cure mental illness and have serious
side effects. The primary benefit of psychoactive drugs is to
temporarily make a person more manageable, and they do not
produce any permanent changes (Bartol & Bartol, 1986). Moreover, as major tranquilizers, they can be used as an effective
means of social control in an institution. Churgin (1983) cited
a study in his article which showed that inmates in one prison
system were transferred to mental hospitals for being disruptive
and not for being mentally ill. Occasionally, one hears snide
references about the Soviet Union who reportedly put some of
their dissidents in psychiatric hospitals as a means of stifling
dissent. But the same type of practice can be done to citizens in
the United States who are powerless and despised, like prison
inmates are, if the right to refuse treatment is unavailable.
Whenever something of a treatment nature is planned for an
inmate, the following question needs to be asked "is it really for
the inmate or is it for the institution"? While institutional social
control is not per se opprobrious, it can be if allowed to go
unchecked. The courts have offered some fairly sound guidelines
spelling out when psychiatric or psychological treatment is indicated (Ruiz v. Estelle, 1980), and all are focused on the inmates'
needs rather than institutional. Allowing inmates the limited
right to refuse questionable therapies and drugs is necessary in
order to protect against institutional abuses.
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"Our Town": A Case Study of Ideology and the
Private Social Welfare Sector
WILLIAM M. EPSTEIN

Management Consultant
Washington, D.C.

This case study explores the relationship between ideology and the
performance of the voluntary social welfare sector in Western New
York. Data were collected from the directors of 22 of the largest and
most important voluntary social welfare agencies relating to their own
social attitudes and those of their boards. The common expression of
similar agency attitudes toward a variety of social policies were in
narrow conformity with the conservative values of the current national
administration. The common core of conservative values, suggesting
that the agencies perform an ideological role within the community in
addition to their service role, may explain much of their decision to
ignore great and growing social needs. Yet most troubling for the possibility of liberal reform, the ideological commitments of the voluntary
social welfare sector and the social preference voiced through its social
service programs may be the widely-shared and regnant values of the
contemporary United States.

Currently at issue in the debate over social welfare services,
is the degree to which the United States shall satisfy the needs
of lower socio-economic groups, in part through social work
and its agencies. The past five national administrations, covering
almost 17 years, have structured a social service system that
does not seem to be responsive to growing social problems. If
these emergent needs, as well as other longer standing deprivations, are going to be addressed, then the preferences that
control national politics will also have to change. This change
will probably come about, if at all, only through a competition
in which organizations with stakes in the current distribution
of goods and services give ground to organizations pursuing a
different pattern of rewards. If lower socio-economic groups are
to achieve greater welfare, then political organizations will have
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to contend for their interests. This is axiomatic of social welfare
politics: welfare gains in proportion to political success.
The ideological commitments and service roles of an important portion of social work's institutional base-the voluntary
social service sector-influence the politics of social services.
When voluntary social service agencies serve lower status clients,
they champion both their clients' claims and the programs to
serve them. When, to the contrary, the voluntary sector is animated by other interests, then its program justifications tend to
weigh those heavier claims against the claims of lower status
clients. In any event, private social service agencies take a variety of sophisticated steps to form public attitudes and opinions
in support of their missions. These steps are political.
The ideological roles of private social service agencies in developing public opinion may be more frequent determinants of
their own success than their apparent social service function. In
spite of claims that current practice is scientific, few agencies
and few social work services have ever credibly demonstrated
cure, prevention or rehabilitation. Even the efficacy of casework's "nuclear" technique, psychotherapy, is still indeterminate, (Wootton 1959; Epstein 1984a; Epstein 1984; and Bergin,
1971). Nevertheless, voluntary social service agencies seem to
be refunded, year after year, without scientifically defensible
service histories.
This puzzle of agency continuity is solved when an agency's
value lies more in its symbolic and ideological role than in its
service function (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In this event an
agency's principal role is to form or to confirm political tastes
through the voice that it addresses to the community in support
of its selection of clients, services and organizational forms. In
turn, its service designs tend to reflect the preferences of its
auspices more than any objective standard of social need.
In a provocative case study written over twenty years ago,
Cloward and Epstein implicated the professionalization of social
work in the voluntary sector's disengagement from the poor. The
authors described a private agency whose "structured incapacity" to serve lower socio-economic groups reflected a "strategy
of help which (was) neither practicable nor congenial to" the
needs of poor people (Cloward and Epstein, 1967); Sosin, 1985).1
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Yet, notwithstanding their criticisms, they tacitly shared the belief that institutional social work could still be bent toward more
client-oriented ends. The key to this reform lay in the political
malleability of agency auspices, that is, the degree to which
private boards could be reconstituted first to more closely represent client populations and then, to give voice to client
aspirations.
In support of these goals, a descendent literature created a
heroic practice role for the social worker and the private social
service agency. It cast the social worker and his agency in the
role of a catalyst, a "change inducing system", a provocateur to
develop a latent social constituency into a political tool for the
redirection of practice (Warren 1977; Henderson and Thomas,
1983; Piven and Cloward, 1971). The field's scholars began to
model this heroic process in terms of the stakes, the rewards,
the flashpoints and the structural weaknesses of contemporary
society. The summary assumptions were made, and may even
have been tested by the Great Society programs, that a social
will existed to serve the unserved and that social work and its
allies were capable of converting that will into the enforceable
claims of social policy. This reform literature evoked a nostalgic
myth-social work's Brandesian vision-that the poor, who stood
as proxy for all socially deprived groups, had been better served
by social work during prior periods.
In contrast to the reform tradition, another body of thought
has granted to social work far less freedom either to plan its
own destiny or to modify social policy. In particular, Leiby has
concluded that social work's historical role was performed neither in service to the poor nor as a champion of reform.
• ..'"Social welfare institutions and the profession of social work
did not grow into their present prominence because of their
theoretical elegance or practical success" (Leiby, 1978). Social
workers typically rendered personal care, screened clients for
welfare eligibility and most importantly, personified the virtues
of social conformity. Moreover, these roles were usually performed on behalf of social elites, themselves customarily drawn
from among the wealthier commercial classes.
In further support of this view of the profession's historical
orthodoxy, many modem social welfare historians seem to agree

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

first that cultural forces determine welfare practice to a far greater
extent than social welfare practitioners and secondly, that the
power of the charitable impulse to affect social policy-altrusim
as a political force-has been negligible (Garrity, 1978; Mencher
1967; Lubove, 1965; Himmelfarb, 1984.)2 In further support of
the futility of heroic reform, an influential sociological tradition,
exemplified by Nisbet (1969) and Lapiere (1954), defines social
maintenance, not change, as the causal motive of society. Strongly
held cultural attitudes inexorably perfuse social institutions. In
this sense, social work as a cultural institution will inevitably
reflect the dominant attitudes of society. Therefore any strategy
of agency change that challenges dominant social attitudes and
beliefs, will fail if it is contingent on social acceptance, expressed
perhaps through charitable or public funding.
The reform tradition in social work, hard pressed to find a
legacy of program success, does not seriously reject the controlling influence of social maintenance on agency behavior.
Rather, it holds that the terms of accommodation can be negotiated through a constituency for client oriented reform. As a
component of this negotiation, the reformers define institutional
social work potentially if not historically, as an early mediator
of social change and as an advocate for marginal groups. In
contrast, social work may have a much more deferred role-one
of only providing service and not contending for the conditions
of its provision. The social worker may have a more passive
professional function: to implement board preferences through
agency policy.
The Study
Specific concern with the ideological and political behavior
of voluntary agencies emerged out of a broader study of the
feasibility of an alliance between the unions and the voluntary
social service sector in Western New York. With an unemployment rate that reached over 15% in November of 1982, Western
New York has been one of the hardest hit of the Northeast's rustbelt regions. Buffalo, a city of approximately 320,000, is the urban center of the two counties that comprise the SMSA of Western New York. Western New York's population, having declined
more than 10% since the 1970 census, numbered just over one
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million by 1980. All of the large agencies and most of the smaller
agencies were located in Buffalo itself although almost all of
them provided extensive services through out the metropolitan
area.
Western New York has been losing population and jobs for
the past two decades, suffering a decline of 49,500 jobs or 9.6%
of its total employment between 1979 and 1983 alone. As a consequence of economic distress, social needs have increased. Yet
the capacity of the people remaining in Western New York to
meet those needs has declined.
Through a case study of one metropolitan area, this paper
explores the general issue of the voluntary sector's role in mediating social needs.
Method
The contemporary roles of the larger and more dominant
voluntary social welfare agencies in Western New York were
studied through interviews with their executive directors. Information was collected from the agency directors through semistructured interviews, designed to last approximately 75
minutes. The respondents were encouraged to express themselves freely on a range of topics related to agency practice and
structure, to their own social and political attitudes and to those
of their boards (Table 1). Where appropriate, interviewers probed
Table 1
Information Gathered from the Directors

Respondent characteristics
Agency characteristics
Auspices characteristics
Respondent report of his own political and social attitudes
Respondent report of his board social and political attitudes
Agency problems
Social problems generally
Agency plans
Perceived need for support
Experience and attitudes toward organized labor
Attitudes toward the future
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the respndents in order to obtain coherent and complete
statements.
Voluntary social service agencies were selected on the basis
of their large human service budgets, their historical prominence and their centrality to social work practice. A core of traditional voluntary agencies was supplemented with a number
of additional programs to better reflect the range of service roles
fulfilled by voluntary agencies in the community. The sample,
however, clearly overrepresented traditional, large agencies. Of
27 agencies initially selected for interviews, 22 (81%) were successfully completed.
The sample covers the private sector's presence in: counselling; residential and outpatient care for the deinstitutionalized
mental health client and for people with developmental disabilities; traditional recreational and character building services; vocational rehabilitation; emergency shelters; and planning and
funding.
In all but one instance, the respondent was the agency's chief
administrative officer. The sample included: the local chapters
of the American Red Cross, the United Way, Catholic Charities,
Goodwill Industries, the Blind Association, Jewish Family Services, Child and Family Services, the Boys Clubs, the Lutheran
Service Society, and the YMCA; three mental health programs
for "deinstitutionalized" clients; a Meals-on-Wheels program;
three programs for people with developmental and mental disabilities; a shelter for battered women; the local mental health
association; two additional counselling programs; and a local
shelter for homeless men.
The author and six graduate social work students interviewed the directors of the voluntary social welfare agencies
during the Winter of 1985. The author also interviewed the graduate students in order to compare their attitudes with those of
their interviewees. No consistent pattern of bias was apparent.
Indeed the range of social attitudes and political preferences
among the students was greater than the range among the agency
directors. Liberal students recorded conservative opinions, and
the few conservative students recorded liberal responses.
Yet by and large the students tended to be liberal. This may
have been the directors' perception with the result that they may
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have tended to liberalize their reported views or to suppress
some contradictory conservative views of their boards. Indeed,
the directors' response rate to the more sensitive questions probing their auspices'- social and political views, were consistently
lower than the response rates of labor leaders in describing their
memberships. Yet the directors' low response rates to a number
of items may also reflect the small degree of informal association
between directors and their boards and the extent to which directors may have been guarded in making any critical appraisal
of their employer. Therefore the final estimates of attitudes probably underreport conservative views.
Characteristicsof the Sample
The combined unduplicated budgets of the 22 agencies total
more than $60 million, of which more than half comes from
public sources (Salamon and Abramson, 1982). 3 Six agencies
draw more than 90% of their budgets from private sources. The
agencies contained a mean number of 148 staff; six of the agencies contained more than 100 staff members, while only six had
fewer than 50.
The directors had been in their positions for a mean of 9.3
years and earned a mean salary of $41,600. Nine had social work
degrees. Eighteen of the 22 were male. While ten of the agencies
had advisory boards, the administrative and legal responsibilities for all of them were vested in nonproft boards of directors.
In one case, the legal and administrative responsibilities were
vested in separate bodies.
In a classic juxtaposition, wealthy high-status boards ran
agencies for poor, low-status clients. Through intuitive classification, three (13.1%) of the 22 boards were characterized as
predominantly upper class, 12 as predominantly upper middle,
and only seven had middle-class or very mixed boards. Typically, board members were drawn from business and the
professions.
Findings
Both the directors and their boards clearly perceived the
depth of local social problems. Yet, they had not modified their
agencies to address these problems. Apparently, the emergent
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needs of the recently unemployed as well as many of the longstanding problems caused by chronic unemployment fall outside
of the narrowly defined roles of the voluntary social welfare
sector in Western New York. Agency plans to expand their roles
when they did exist, were modest in scope, and usually prepared the agency to compete for a greater share of some fixed
resource. Therefore one agency's plans to expand its service role
entailed an attenuated role for some other, similar program.
In spite of the directors' near universal belief that their agencies deserved greater funding, they had not been moved by a
live budget threat to take the first step and identify operational
obstacles to additional resources. No respondent defined a new
agency role to extend services to large pools of unmet needs.
No agency defined a social advocacy role. No agency planned
to organize a new constituency to secure additional resources
for emerging needs. No agency planned to develop different
auspices or to expand their current one. Instead, managerial
energies and the policy priorities of the boards were focused
inward to standardize services for an already demarcated client
population.
The voluntary sectors' refusal to serve unmet community
needs, its comfort with current agency functions, implemented
the boards' conservative social and political perspectives and the
directors' compliance with that mood in carrying through agency
policies.
Social Problems
All but one of the agencies recognized that the failure of the
local economy has produced poverty and unemployment. Table 2
suggests the directors' broad agreement on the prevalence of
major social problems. Fully eighteen of 21 respondents felt that
their boards would agree with their characterization of current
social problems in Western New York. The remaining three respondents felt that their boards would "somewhat agree". No
respondent felt that his board would disagree with his description of the nature of current social problems.
Agency Problems, Obstacles and Remedies
The directors' definitions of their own agencies' problems
(Table 3) seemed to be only superficially related to their defini-
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Table 2
General Social Problems. Number and Percent of Sample Reporting Each
Social Problem
Social Problem

Number

Percent

21

95.5

6
5
2
2
9

27.3
22.7
9.1
9.1
40.9

Poverty and unemployment
Family (abuse, neglect,
break-up, etc.)
Substance abuse
Health and mental health
Lack of education
Others

Table 3
Problems Facedby Agencies. Number and Percent of Sample Reporting
Each Problem
Problem

Number

Financial (total)
Funding
Staff salaries
Local economy

19

Management (total)
Director's time
Staff morale
Service design
Data
Other (total)
Conflict with public agency
Control of agency
Competition with other
agency
Unmet social needs
Insurance
Too much growth
Transportation
Negative public attitudes
Preaching
Stealing (of residents)

Percent
86.4

17
1
3
6

77.3
4.5
13.6
27.3

1
1
5
1
14

4.5
4.5
22.7
4.5
63.6

3
1

13.6
4.5

3
2
1
1
1
2
1
1

13.6
9.1
4.5
4.5
4.5
9.1
4.5
4.5
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tion of the region's social service needs, especially those related
to unemployment and poverty. Indeed, only two of the 22 respondents reported that "unmet social needs" came within the
scope of their agency's current mission. Although 17 (77.3%) of
22 respondents stated that their agencies faced "funding" problems, these reports tended to be reflexive and superficial. Directors described few live funding threats resulting, for example,
from the program cuts of the Reagan years. To the contrary,
many of these agencies had actually prospered. They were neither dependent upon appropriations in the areas of the major
social welfare declines (Food Stamps, CETA, and so forth), nor
were they involved at a policy or political level in pressing for
program restorations on behalf of affected clients. Some of the
agencies even seemed to welcome those service cuts, especially
where they diminished the direct service role of the public sector
in deference to private contracts.
The directors reported a range of managerial activities characteristic of organizations that are in the process of routinizing
a well defined role rather than in the process of modifying their
agency mission to address new problems. Only three of 22 agencies felt that the effects of the local economy or the politicalization of unmet social needs might imperil their budgets and thus
create pressures for new goals and roles (Table 4).
In spite of the directors' near unanimity in placing poverty
and unemployment at the root of most other social problems, no
Table 4
The PrincipalObstacles to the Success of CurrentAgency Plans. Number
and Percentof Sample Reporting Each Obstacle.

Obstacle
General or local economy
Public agency intransigence
Internal agency resistance
Bad public image
Worn-out physical plant
Other obstacles
No obstacle reported

Number

Percent

8
5
3
2
1
5
2

36.4
22.7
13.6
9.1
4.5
N/A
9.1
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agency planned any major expansion of its current mission either
to address the needs that were emerging from these problems
or to call more public attention to them. Nevertheless many
agencies steadfastly maintained the priority of their current
counselling programs. Meanwhile no agency claimed, even implicitly, that the scope of its current role was sufficient for local
social needs, including those that fell within the boundaries of
its current service function.
While the directors acknowledged the desirability of expanded agency roles to handle unmet social needs, no agency
had taken serious steps to realize those hopes. Typically, plans
to increase an agency's role entailed a minor renovation, the
addition of a staff person, a small amount of research, regulatory
relief from a public agency, entry into a new but limited service
for existing clients, or an internal reorganization of staff or
services.
Reports of more assertive agency plans-"political action,"
"social action," or "advocacy"-referred in practice to more parochial tactics: follow-up to a referral agency and agency advocacy
in the sense of kindred organizations coming together to seek
relief from the reporting burdens and heavy handedness of their
supporting public agencies. Only four of the 22 respondents
planned political action and this usually meant petitioning a
state legislator to pump a public agency for greater moneys. No
agency planned any standard community outreach event to publicize emerging needs. Not surprisingly then, 18 (90%) of 20
respondents felt that much of "the needed political and social
influence required to realize their goals had already been
achieved."
The two most frequently reported remedies (Table 5)-management consultation and private fund raising, each mentioned
by eight (36.4%) of 22 respondents-are both narrow in scope
and consistent with inward-looking managerial attention to the
efficacy of agency operations. In these cases, the directors faced
staff problems, or they had the ear of a local philanthropist or
they hoped to increase their appropriations from the local United
Way.
Agency ambitions were so modest, especially in the face of
emergent social needs, and their planned remedies were so tame
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Table 5
Steps Currently in Place to Remedy the Problems Faced by Agencies.
Number and Percentof Sample Reporting Each remedy

Remedy
Management consultation
Private fundraising
More services and other
administrative changes
Political action
New staffing
Board training
Staff training
Restructure the board
Legal redress
No remedy

Number

Percent

8
8

36.4
36.4

5
4
3
2
1
1
1
1

22.7
18.1
13.6
9.1
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5

that only four of 22 respondents felt pessimistic ("little" or "no"
chance of success) about "the steps that (their) agency had taken
to remedy the problems that it faced." Moreover only 6 (27.3%)
of 22 respondents predicted an ominous future in which economic failures, political insensitivities, or social preferences for
continuing in a conservative policy direction jeopardized the
continuity of their agencies. Fully 18 (85.9%) of 21 respondents,
secure in the prestige of their boards and the apparent worthiness of their clients' claims on service, were "very confident" of
the success of their low risk-low reward agency strategies.
Social and PoliticalAttitudes

Agency complacency reflected the conservative social views
of their boards and the agency directors' easy acceptance of the
limits on agency operations that those values implied. Thirteen
(72.2%) of eighteen respondents guessed that a majority of their
board members had voted for President Reagan in the 1984 elections. Thirteen (61.9%) of the 21 respondents characterized the
general political orientation of their boards as either "conservative" or "moderately" conservative, while only 3 (14.3%) of
the 21 respondents characterized their boards as "liberal" or
"moderately" liberal. 4
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The basic conservative political orientation of the boards was
consistent with their specific policy views toward taxes, the role
of government, organized labor, welfare and abortion. The directors characterized ten (50%) of their boards as having decidedly negative feelings toward taxes, accepting the trade-off (or
double benefit, perhaps, in their eyes) between lower taxes and
lower services. Only six boards (30%), tending to control the
smaller agencies, were willing to sustain higher taxes in order
to pay for more services.
Fourteen (66.7%) of 21 respondents reported that their boards
were decidedly negative toward the current role of government,
characterizing it as intrusive, impersonal, too large, inflexible,
inept, inefficient, and ineffective. While they acknowledged some
role for government in funding services, they felt that the private
sector, through boards such as theirs, had the principal responsibility to administer the funds. Yet all but one of the agencies
accepted public moneys and all of them fulfilled traditional welfare functions. Nevertheless, 11 (55%) of the 20 respondents felt
that their boards had antagonistic or mixed attitudes toward the
provision of public welfare itself (in addition to the perceived
inefficiency of the welfare system).
Twelve (54.5%) of 22 directors were willing to estimate their
boards' view toward abortion and free choice. Yet only six (50%)
of those 12 respondents reported views that either endorsed free
choice or the Cuomo position (against abortion personally but
for its legal availability).
In contrast to their boards' attitudes, the directors described
themselves as somewhat more liberal with slightly more expansive views toward taxation and the provision of welfare, and
much more positive pro-choice views toward abortion. Moreover, far fewer directors characterized their own general political
orientation as "conservative" or "moderately conservative." Yet
10 (45%) of the 22 responding directors stated that they had
voted for President Reagan in 1985.
In one other important regard the directors and their boards
were in substantial agreement: both groups had similarly hostile
views toward organized labor. Even though 11 of 20 respondents
felt that organized labor should be represented on their boards,
this marginal inclusion was made only in reluctant deference to
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the potential of the unions to secure agency goals. Still 12 (57%)
of the 21 respondents reported no current "relationship (formal,
social, political or other) with any union or union leader."
Fourteen (66.7%) of the directors felt that the unions were
not currently a progressive social force (seven "maybe," none
said "yes"). Citing their earlier legislative successes at securing
minimum wages, child labor laws, and so forth, many directors
felt that there was not a strong current need for labor unions.
Moreover they felt that many unions had been acting irresponsibly, especially in terms of unreasonable wage demands. No
director characterized the unions as an important working class
institution to be courted for their social meaning. Only two of
the 21 responding directors felt that the future success of their
agencies might be dependent in any large way on the support
of organized labor. Fifteen (71.4%) of 21 respondents predicted
gloomy futures for organized labor.
Only one (5.6%) of 18 respondents felt that his own board
would hold more positive attitudes toward organized labor (and
this respondent's views toward the unions was among the most
antagonistic), while half (9) felt that their boards would respond
in "virtually the same manner." In short, the boards and the
directors evaluated the unions as an unimportant and sometimes hostile constituency for their agencies.
Their common hostility toward organized labor suggests that
voluntary social welfare agencies were very unlikely to seek support for unmet social needs in Western New York-assuming
for a moment that they would want to-through an alliance with
the unions. It appeared that such an alliance would be premature, and surprisingly, not for the reluctance of local labor leaders
to pursue allies in the social welfare community. Rather, the
voluntary social welfare sector itself-its boards and its directors-presented the principal barrier to the development of a
common front with labor in support of expanded social services
(Epstein, unpublished).
All in all, the directors report that they are substantially in
agreement with the social views of their boards, especially as
they affect the policies of the agencies. In no instance was the
difference between the views of a director and his board characterized as "very great." Rather, nine directors report "no dif-
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ference" or "little difference" with the views of their boards.
Only one director saw his differences with his board as "great"
and eleven directors perceived "some difference" with their
boards.
Still ten directors felt that their boards' social views should
change to be more in line with their own (and these were views
with direct impact on the role of the agency). However only
three of these directors had any formal mechanism in place, and
only one director was attempting informally, to achieve this
change. These tactics usually involved only the passive introduction of information. While 14 of 22 respondents perceived a
need to change the composition of the board, not one of these
14 argued that the change would be needed to better represent
unmet populations of need. Usually the board changes were
motivated by more mundane managerial concerns: needed technical skills (an accountant, a lawyer) or the functioning of elderly
board members. In short only 4 (19%) of 21 respondents were
in any way contesting their boards' conservatism.
The directors' relations with their boards seemed to be narrowly circumscribed by agency operation. Few directors either
interacted socially with their boards or thought that informal
interactions were desireable. In spite of their more "liberal" and
avowedly humanistic commitment to broader welfare entitlements and services, the directors passively fulfilled a narrow
managerial function, implementing their boards' restrictive social views through agency operations.
Agency Missions
In line with their conservative boards and their passiveness,
no respondent defined the mission of his agency or the perspective of his board within the structure of a modem welfare
state: a core of social services broadly provided on the basis of
right. Moreover, there was no reference, in justifying their
agency's missions, to the egalitarian tenet of a welfare state that
public solutions were proper for shared risks. To the contrary
and reminiscent of the characteristic theme in American welfare
legislation that public provision is only temporary, the voluntary
sector held a strong belief in the "exceptional" nature of all publicly underwritten social services.
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Board members were reportedly motivated to serve: by a
desire to be associated with helping programs; by the sense that
participation on voluntary boards was a devout charitable obligation of their social position; by their strong sense of voluntarism and localism; by a belief in their skill to monitor and to
manage social services; and, by their orientation to the ethos of
the business community. The toughening experience of competitive private enterprise seemed to justify their deaconship of
social services and their position on the boards.
Although 12 (55%) of the 22 agencies (and usually those with
the largest budgets) received more than 50% of their funding
from public sources, the boards still identified their agencies
strongly with sectarian purposes, temporary service roles, and
the personal altruistic impulse. Agencies took up posts on the
shores of social need to manage a reduced public commitment
with a receding tide of popularity for social services and to act
as a flood wall against a rising popular appetite for greater public
service (and taxes). The agencies defined themselves as cherished private organizations: they expressed little commitment,
at any time, to the institutionalized public sector in the provision
of social services.
Table 6 approximates the distribution of agencies and budgets by their service missions. Although an agency's entire budget is assigned to the single category that best describes its
mission, in practice most agency budgets cross into more than
one area. So, for example, much of the budgets of the "counselling" agencies are actually expended on "surrogate care," especially for foster children. Notwithstanding this failure to
disaggregate budgets, the mission priorities of the voluntary
sector are quite clear, and would probably have been even more
apparent if detailed budget allocations had been possible. "Manifest impairments" and the programs of the social service infrastructures nearly excluded concern with the more "social"
needs. Indeed, it is apparent that the direct needs that arise out
of economic and social failures were not considered at all by the
voluntary sector until they may have produced manifest behavioral disabilities or a life-threatening condition in which an individual cannot care for himself any longer.
Taken together, the agencies had narrowly refined their prin-
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Table 6
Type of Agency Mission by Number and PercentDistributionof Agencies
and by DollarAmount (in millions) and Percent Distributionof 1984
Budget Totals.
Agencies
Mission

Budgets

N

%

5

22.7

9.05

11.6

4
1

18.2
4.5

13.95
19.60

17.0
24.2

10

45.4

42.80

52.8

3

13.6

14.50

17.7

Total

3

13.6

14.50

17.7

-"Social" needs
Surrogate care
Counselling

3
3

13.6
13.6

1.67
8.30

2.0
10.1

Total

6

27.2

9.27

12.1

1

4.5

.06

*

20

90.7

67.33

82.6

Funding, Planningand Advocacy
-Funding
-Advocacy

1
1

4.5
4.5

14.00
.32

17.1

Total Funding, Planning
and Advocacy

2

9.0

14.32

17.1

22

99.7 a

81.85

99.7 a

Direct Service
-Mental and Physical
Community mental health and
outpatient psychiatric
Physical and vocational
rehabilitation
Extremely mixed
Total
-Infrastructure: recreational,
informational, athletic and
cultural

-Other
Total Direct Service

Total All Missions

':=less than 1.0%
a=total may not reach 100% due to rounding

N

%

*
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cipal mission priorities: first, to justify and to manage intensive
direct services for a relatively small number of very impaired
clients (the physically or psychiatrically debilitated, or both);
secondly, to provide thinly staffed recreational, informational
and cultural programs for a large portion of the community. In
the first instance, the emotional and self-validating claims of
impairments resulting from mental retardation, schizophrenia,
cerebral palsy, polio, birth defects and so forth were seen as
sufficient to secure public and private resources. In the second
instance, the apparent desireability of at least a modicum of a
largely self-supervised (by users) municipal social service infrastructure was sufficient to justify recreational, informational
and cultural agencies. The legitimacy of these residual service
roles have historically been acknowledged outside of work-related marketplace considerations.
The third and smallest mission priority was to provide service for "social" clients. Their debility was not manifestly physical
or psychiatric yet they required frank financial support or the
relatively intensive attentions of expensive personnel (as for example, the "child and family service" outpatient client who pays
for counselling on a sliding fee scale) to resolve an emotional or
behavioral disorder. These services were justified along criteria
of cost efficiency. That is, timely services for "social" clients
might prevent more expensive physical and psychiatric care and
might possibly allow "social" clients to partake of far less expensive infrastructure services. Yet few counselling services were
funded, and these were customarily for the surrogate care of
"social" clients who passed an implicit work test. In this regard,
abused, abandoned and neglected children and battered wives,
accounted for much of the "social" expenditures in the voluntary
sector. Almost all of the foster care services were publicly
underwritten.
Even while watching their numbers grow, the Western New
York voluntary social service sector was in the process of deepening the distinction between the physically and mentally impaired and the socially deprived by concentrating its service
eforts on the obviously worthy impaired client. In effect, by
refusing to address the current conditions of Western New York's
"stern necessity," the agencies-even those serving "social
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clients"-tacitly complied with the continuing erosion of services to unemployed and marginal working class groups.
A common theme was being championed by the voluntary
agency boards. The national economic emergency (the recession
and the need to reindustrialize) together with a growing national
deficit justified the superordinate claims of both impaired clients
and the community's infrastructure over subordinate claims
growing out of unemployment and poverty. The voluntary sector's near total refusal to give voice or otherwise attempt to legitimize the claims on resources of the physically unimpaired
but still needy client constituted agency policy consistent with
their own conservative mindset.
Conclusions
The voluntary social welfare sector in Western New York
may not be hospitable to a representative range of social attitudes. The high prevalence of similarly expressed agency attitudes constitutes a social perspective that is characteristic of the
voluntary agencies. Voting patterns, the social and political views
of the boards and their attitudes toward both the government's
role and the missions of their agencies are generally in line
with the conservative philosophy of the present national
administration.
Their preferences for a small service agenda, a small tax burden and the avoidance of redistributional impulses are given
more specific expression through agency policies: their choice
of private control over public auspices; rejection of a civil service
or unionized work force in favor of a much less institutionalized
and lower-paid, nonprofessional staff; preference for a volunteer-rich staff mix; narrow eligibility for services as opposd to
broader entitlements; temporary, task specific services instead
of a more permanent and general commitment to social welfare;
and a residual agency role relative to social need rather than a
proactive approach to the seemingly permanent imperfections
of the social and economic system.
The harmony between the social views of their boards and
agency policy suggests that in addition to the provision of services, voluntary welfare agencies also fulfill a strongly ideological
role. This ideological role is performed in a narrow context when
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an agency justifies its program choices in terms of cost efficiency.
The ideological role is also performed more broadly when an
agency interprets to its community, the value of program outcomes in terms of social conditions and social responsibilities.
Therefore in fulfilling the broad obligations of its ideological
role, an agency evaluates, at least for itself, the social distances
among groups and thereby contributes toward a political decision either to change or to maintain those distances. In another
sense, this judgment constitutes a brief for the fairness of current
economic conditions and thus speaks to the issue of whether
policy should pursue benefits for some groups at the expense
of others.
While its direct service function is an obvious element in an
agency's mission, its greater importance is expressed through
the voice that it directs toward the community in order to justify
its choice of services, of clients and of organizational patterns.
This voice is controlled by its board of directors. Historically,
the boards of directors have frequently articulated the values of
dominant commercial community elites.
The pervasive "isomorphism" with conservative values
among voluntary social service agencies in Western New York
explains much of their decision to maintain a passive and narrow
service role in a community with great and growing social needs.
The voluntary sector has clearly chosen not to champion the
claims of unserved groups. In conformity with this preference,
agency directors are screened far more closely for their compliance with board preferences than for their prior training or experience. 5 Therefore the quality of a director's managerial skills
may miss the ideological boat; agency success will be determined less by the ability to choose rationally among program
alternatives than by the ability to proselytize board values.
In effect then, social service agencies in the private sector
are powerful voices of political education that reinforce a selected and usually conservative range of social values. The selection of an agency's board of directors may have a more
trenchant meaning in determining social welfare outcomes than
the actual operations of the agency itself.
The obvious conclusion of this analysis is that agency ideology must first change if voluntary social service agencies are
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to better serve large pools of unmet needs. This may imply too,
that the composition of voluntary sector boards must change to
better represent those unmet needs. Yet in order for agencies to
change their service missions, the claims of the unserved must
first be legitimized politically and socially. This process of legitimization becomes an implicit institutional responsibility, if
social work is going to align itself with the needs of lower class
clients. In this case, its intellectual outlets, most notably, the
schools of social work, must take prominent roles in ennobling
service to the needy. Yet social work may currently be moving
in precisely the opposite direction.
Academic social work's narrow attention to an indeterminate
psychotherapeutic practice and to an improbable scientific model
of research may have begun to crowd out the service needs of
lower income groups. Together with the current professional expansion into employee assistance programs and private practice,
the field is moving quickly toward a market based ideology that
deflects social policy away from the structural issues of class to
the issues of personal adjustment.
Yet the most provocative challenge of this case study to the
egalitarian welfare expectations of social work, its reformist ideology, may also be the most obvious one. The ideological commitments of the voluntary social welfare sector and the social
preferences voiced through its social service programs are the
widely shared, popular and regnant values of the contemporary
United States. In spite of the recent neoconservative political
victories that infused new vitality into the voluntary social welfare sector, current social welfare policy expresses widely shared
preferences for voluntary and minimalist responses to social
distress. The national mood seems to reject a more "universal"
welfare state.
Even while accepting the notion that the Reagan Administration's success at social welfare budget-cutting is "less than
meets the eye," this nation may have reached a watershed of
agreement on the social service conditions of its welfare state at
levels far lower than the egalitarian reformers have urged during
the past few decades (Glazer, 1984). The privitistic, market-oriented social values of the current conservative administration
have deeply perfused social institutions, social work among them.
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Footnotes
1. Sosin maintains that the discussion of the relationship between agency
auspices and agency function is "at a preliminary, speculative stage" (76).
Indeed, the literature has not unravelled the causal conditions of agency
outcome: whether ideology causes function or the reverse and the ways
in which both might be related to other factors. It is clear however that
little systematic attention has been given to any of the organizational
characteristics that may be associated with the performance of private
social welfare agencies.
2. This is a tiny selection from a vast literature that searches for the determinants of social policy among the broad social, economic and environmental conditions of society and not in the individual acts of will that
constitute the premises of heroic deeds.
3. This compares closely with the 58% of private social service agency budgets that are reported by Salamon and Abramson to come from Federal
programs.
4. The respondents were asked to score political views along a five point
scale: 1-liberal; 2-moderately liberal; 3-moderate; 4-moderately conservative; 5-conservative. The means were: Directors = 3.0; Boards = 3.8;
Labor leaders = 2.3; and Union members = 3.1.
5. During the few months that elapsed between the data collection and this
write-up the directors of two of the most important agencies, each an
MSW social worker, were replaced by nonsocial workers. (One retired
and the other changed jobs. Neither were forced out.) The replacements
are in greater conformity with the entrepreneurial individualism of the
local Chamber of Commerce.

Recisions, Organizational Conditions and Job
Satisfaction Among Black and White Human
Service Workers: A Research Note*
R. L. MCNEELY
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
School of Social Welfare

Despite the growing attention evident in the human services
literature on the related topics of job satisfaction and burnout,
virtually none of the empirical studies published to date have
examined the possible influences of recent federal and state cutbacks in human service funding levels on the job satisfaction of
human service workers. One outcome of these cutbacks has
been the curtailment of services offered by county welfare departments, often achieved by reducing the number of public
welfare workers through hiring freezes, attrition, layoffs, etc.
The remaining public welfare workers often have then been
placed in the unenviable position of trying to maintain, as best
they can, previous levels of service with fewer staff and smaller
budgets.
McNeely and Schultz (1986) have suggested recently that
these conditions adversely impact the satisfactions received from
county welfare work. However, their contentions were based
largely upon a content analysis of extemporaneous remarks made
by 481 subjects participating in a national survey (N = 1500)
that was designed to identify predictors of job satisfaction among
public welfare workers. Data presented in this report were obtained from the national survey: They offer a basis for assessing
the degree to which empirical support is provided for McNeely
and Schultz's hypothesis. The data have been collected over a
period of several years from 1,500 county welfare workers located in geographically disparate areas of the nation. Data ob*The research reported in this article was funded by the School of Social
Welfare, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The author wishes to acknowledge David Austin for his comments on material reported in this article.
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tained for the study, fortunately, include information on the racial
status of respondents. The inclusion of race is important because, due to having less seniority, Blacks and Hispanics often
have been more vulnerable than Caucasians to cutback-inspired
threats of layoffs or terminations. Published reports of previous
findings generated by the broader study may be found elsewhere (McNeely, 1983; 1984; 1985; 1987; NcNeely, et al., 1986).
Data were collected in Wisconsin from the Racine Comprehensive Human Service Department (RHSD) in 1981. Data were
obtained in 1983 from the Dade County (Fla.) Department of
Human Resources (DDHR). Employees of the Genesee County
(Mich.) Department of Social Services (GDSS) and the County
of Sacramento (Calif.) Department of Social Welfare (SDSW) were
surveyed in 1984. The variety of conditions present in the four
county departments offered an opportunity to examine whether
or not job satisfaction levels varied in accord with the severity
of retrenchments experienced during the periods surveys were
conducted.
In brief, the onset of recisions began in 1981 following the
Reagan administration's efforts to curtail spending for social
service programs. Since then, reductions in federal funding for
human service programs have become increasingly pronounced.
Anticipation of the initial wave of federal budget recisions
resulted in a 5% reduction in RHSD staff during 1981 (McNeely,
1985). Consequently RHSD staff were forced to accept increased
workloads and diminished job security. By 1983, when DDHR
was surveyed, the cycle of erosion in federal spending had worsened, forcing progressively sterner conditions in county welfare
work. However, DDHR was less impacted by these conditions
than many other county departments due to its location in a
state with a comparatively thriving economy. Although some
retrenchment had occurred, new programs were being implemented, new staff were being hired, new support equipment
was being purchased, and funds were available for miscellaneous projects. In contrast, SDSW not only had felt the brunt of
many recisions by 1984, it had been victimized previously by
the passage in 1978 of Proposition 13. Social services staff were
reduced by 12% during 1981. Although passed in 1978, the effects of Proposition 13 were not felt by the Department until
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1982 following the failure in court of a suit challenging the legality of Proposition 13. Beginning in 1983, 34 additional employees, primarily those in managerial positions, were demoted
as yet another response to trimmed budgets.
The conditions under which SDSW operated in 1984, unquestionably, were more stressful than those experienced by
RHSD in 1981, or those experienced by DDHR in 1983. RHSD
had not suffered a twin onslaught in 1981. Nor had RHSD staff
witnessed the continuation of federal retrenchments that was to
follow soon. As indicated previously, DDHR was comparatively
unaffected.
GDSS, perhaps, operated under the most stressful conditions of all. Due to the sudden menacing decline of Michigan's
automobile industry and the corresponding shortfalls in state
tax revenues, in 1980 Governor William Milliken declared that
state employment rolls would have to be cut. The situation was
exacerbated in the human services sector with federal recisions,
resulting in the elimination of some programs and the merger
of others. Mr. Charles Williams, GDSS executive director, estimates that between 15 and 20% of GDSS staff were lost. To
make matters worse, thousands of employees were being laid
off by the many automotive plants located in Genesee County.
Thus, the number of needy individuals clamoring for social
services was increasing markedly at the same time the number
of staff providing services was decreasing.
Unfortunately, a precise measurement of the impact of recisions on the four departments cannot be provided. For example,
assessing the impact of demotions versus the threat or reality of
layoffs was beyond the scope of data collected for the survey.
Additionally, had the study been a laboratory experiment, the
effects of exacerbating factors, such as those resulting from the
enactment of Proposition 13 recisions in Sacramento County and
recisions resulting from the dramatic downturn in Michigan's
economy, could have been controlled. Thus, an exclusive examination of the "pure" effects of federal recisions could have
been undertaken. Too, as the questions examined in this article
were not among the primary research objectives of the parent
study no method other than a ranking, based on the research
team's judgment, of the severity of conditions experienced by
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the departments could be achieved. On this point the ranking
presented in this article was subjected to review by executive
administrative staff in the county departments surveyed, with
all of them concurring that the ranking of conditions experienced
in the four departments was accurate. In fact, there was no disagreement whatsoever that the conditions experienced by GDSS
and SDSW were more stressful than those experienced by RHSD
and DDHR.
One hundred and five subjects from RHSD participated in
the survey in 1981. In 1983, 337 respondents from DDHR returned questionnaires. In 1984, 303 questionnaires were returned from GDSS and 755 questionnaires were returned from
SDSW. Altogether, 3,027 questionnaires had been sent out to
valid home addresses of respondents. The survey yielded a total
of 1500 replies, amounting to a response rate of 49.6%.
Data were collected via a structured mail questionnaire consisting of 115 items. Two job satisfaction indices were imbedded
into the questionnaire. These were the Index of Job Satisfaction
(Brayfield and Rothe, 1951) hereafter referred to as the IJS, and
the Morse Index of Intrinsic Job Satisfaction (Morse, 1953), hereafter referred to as the MI (only the four MI items relating to
intrinsic satisfaction were employed in this study). The JS focuses upon employees' subjective assessments regarding whether
or not a job is unpleasant, boring, like a hobby, more enjoyable
than one's leisure time, etc. It consists of 18 items. IJS scores
were used to determine overall work satisfaction levels. The MI
allowed an assessment of what Herzberg (1959) referred to as
intrinsic job satisfaction. Intrinsic factors refer to those aspects
of the job that satisfy what has been described as the fundamental need of workers for creative and challenging work
(O'Toole, et al., 1973).
The corrected odd-even product-moment reliability coefficient for the IJS is r = .87 (Miller, 1977). No test-retest or splithalf reliability coefficients have been reported for the MI, but
the scale has been found to be highly related to scales measuring
other aspects (such as pride in group performance) of one's overall job satisfaction (Miller, 1977). F-tests were used to analyze
the data.
Presuming a relationship exists between budgetary conditions and the job satisfaction of welfare workers, one would
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Table 1
Overall (IJS) and Intrinsic (MI) Job Satisfaction by Departmental and
Population Groups
Departmental and
Population Groups

N

X

Sd

F-Value

RHSD
DDHR
SDSW
GDSS

Index of Job Satisfaction
1453*
104
66.8
8.4
331
66.0 10.1
28.8
747
60.3 11.6
271
56.6 12.6

RHSD
DDHR
SDSW
GDSS

1459*
105
335
747
272

Blacks
Hispanics
Caucasians

Index of Job Satisfaction
1247**
260
63.4 10.8
111
63.5 10.9
876
60.2 12.2

Blacks
Hispanics
Caucasians

Morse Index
1251**
262
15.5
3.1
112
15.4
3.0
877
14.5
3.4

Significance

.000

Morse Index
16.0
16.1
14.5
13.7

3.1
2.9
3.2
3.7

24.5

.000

9.6

.000

11.4

.000

"Subject totals do not equal totals reported for response rate due to
missing questionnaire data.
* RHSD respondents are excluded because data on racial status were not
collected for subjects employed at RHSD. Individuals reporting their racial
status as "Other" are excluded.
expect RHSD and DDHR staff to report higher satisfaction levels
than those reported for SDSW and GDSS.
Table 1 indicates that job satisfaction levels on both overall
and intrinsic satisfaction conform to the predicted pattern. RHSD
and DDHR employees report significantly higher satisfaction on
both indices than SDSW and GDSS employees. However, a further examination of the data, as may be evidenced in Table 2,
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Table 2
Overall (IJS) and Intrinsic (MI) Job Satisfaction by Departmental
Population Groups
X

Sd

Groups

N*

DDHR
Blacks
Caucasians

Index of Job Satisfaction
259
10.4
167
65.0
9.8
92
67.3

X

N*

Sd

Morse Index
262
170
92

15.8
16.5

3.1
2.9

SDSW
Blacks
Caucasians

619
63
556

59.8
60.5

11.1
11.8

618
62
556

14.6
14.5

3.1
3.3

GDSS
Blacks
Caucasians

258
30
228

62.2
56.8

11.1
12.7

259
30
229

15.2
13.5

3.2
3.7

*RHSD respondents, Hispanics and "Others" are excluded.
yielded a serendipitous finding. (Data on racial status were not
collected for subjects employed at RHSD; thus RHSD was not
included in this portion of the analysis. Similarly, there were
too few Hispanics employed in GDSS to permit the inclusion of
GDSS Hispanics; therefore all Hispanics were removed.) While
the job satisfaction scores of Caucasian employees fit the pattern
of recisions, with DDHR and SDSW Caucasians being the most
satisfied and GDSS Caucasians being significantly less satisfied,
the pattern of satisfaction recorded for Black employees was unrelated to the severity of cutbacks.
Instead, the satisfaction of Blacks fit a different pattern. The
most satisfied Blacks were in GDSS and DDHR. The least satisfied Blacks were in SDSW. At the time of the surveys, the
executive directors of GDSS and DDHR were Black; the SDSW
director was Caucasian. These observations tended to suggest
that the racial status of an executive director may have a substantive effect (cf. Fox and Lefkowitz) on the satisfaction of Black
employees, but is virtually unrelated to the satisfaction of Caucasian employees.
A two-way analysis of variance was performed to examine
the hypothesis. As indicated in Table 3, once the effects of county
location are removed, there is no overall difference between the
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Table 3
Two-Way Analysis of Variance of Job Satisfaction Indices by County
and Race
Effect

F-value

d.f.

Significance

2
1
2

.000
.919
.016

2
1
2

.000
.847
.011

Index of Job Satisfaction
Main Effect
County
Race
Interaction (County x Race)

35.74
.01
4.16
Morse Index

Main Effect
County
Race
Interaction (County x Race)

35.21
.04
4.54

racial groups on either job satisfaction measure. However, there
are interaction effects wherein satisfaction between the races
within the counties is patterned very differently. Thus, race differences observed in Table 1 are attributable to differences in
the counties (e.g., Blacks are less satisfied in two of three counties on overall satisfaction despite registering higher aggregate
satisfaction), with the satisfaction of Blacks and Caucasians
within these counties adhering to significantly different patterns, as evidenced by the test of interaction effects. In the case
of Caucasians, the pattern of satisfaction conforms to recision
patterns, with those in the most severely affected programs being
least satisfied. Black satisfaction conforms to the expected pattern with Blacks in departments managed by Black executive
directors being significantly more satisfied than other Blacks.
Nevertheless, the overall effect of race is insignificant.
The statistical insignificance of race was puzzling, and warranted further examination in an effort to account for the finding. Several explanations were explored; the best of these was
rooted in situational organizational conditions peculiar to SDSW.
The twin onslaught imposed on SDSW by Proposition 13
and the effects of continued federal recisions served to inspire
increased union activity seeking to protect workers' jobs. Thus,
the United Public Assistance Workers (UPAW), the independent
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union representing SDSW staff, began a highly visible campaign
in 1981 to force the county board to grant protections ensuring
immunity from layoffs. The high visibility of union activity
seeking job protections, which the county was unable to grant,
served to exacerbate job insecurity fears among SDSW staff.
Under these conditions some employees began to debate who
among them should be laid off first. Some believed that a relatively new group of employees, known as "special skills" workers, should be among the first to go if extensive layoffs occurred.
Special skills employees were those hired to work with Blacks,
Hispanics, Native Americans and Asians (primarily Laotian,
Vietnamese and Chinese). As a group, they had less seniority
than many other employees. Ultimately, a suit was filed to settle
the question.
Special skills employees are required to be members of the
client populations they serve. Consequently, the identification
of special skills employees as those that should be laid off first
targeted many of SDSW's minority employees for employment
jeopardy. The earmarking of minority employees for layoffs fostered negative conditions within the organization, resulting in
widespread claims of racism, and reverse racism. Given this
climate, it is understandable how Blacks employed at SDSW
were less satisfied than Blacks employed elsewhere. Nonetheless, they were more satisfied than GDSS's Caucasian employees, and nearly as satisfied as SDSW's Caucasian workers, both
of whom appeared to be reacting to the effects of budgetary
retrenchments.
Data presented in this report are suggestive of the need to
take into account the possible influence of funding retrenchments in future job satisfaction studies involving human service
workers (cf. NcNeely and Schultz, 1986). The satisfaction levels
of these workers may be as reflective of the presence or absence
of adequate funding as it is of more static, situationally less
sensitive factors such as job challenge, autonomy, facilitative
leadership, job rewards, etc. The latter factors are among those
often identified in the human services literature as predictive of
job satisfaction, but virtually none of these studies have examined budgetary conditions. One recent exception has shown that
predictors of satisfaction are modified during periods of funding
retrenchment (McNeely, 1985).
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Too, the racial status of respondents warrants examination.
Again, virtually none of the human service job satisfaction studies have taken race into account as a possible explanation of, or
influence on satisfaction. One exception is the work of Wright,
Wesley-King and Berg (1985) who concluded that Blacks represent a distinct subpopulation of the larger human services population. Some race-focused studies involving other types of
workers have found substantive differences between Blacks and
Caucasians (cf. Forgionne and Peeters, 1983; Gold, Webb and
Smith, 1982; Bartell, 1981).
In summary, data presented herein are suggestive of possible methodological limitations in the bulk of the human services
job satisfaction literature. Due to the small N (only four county
departments), the findings of this study must be viewed as both
tentative and speculative. In addition, there may be other influences explaining the differences observed between the races that
were not taken into account in this study. Thus, the findings
have been presented for heuristic purposees in an effort to encourage future examinations that consider the possible influence(s) of fiscal conditions, and the posible mediating or
confounding effects of race, or race-related conditions existing
within the organizations being investigated.
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cerlifies that it is an original article and that it has not been published nor is
being considered for publication elsewhere.
Reviewing normally takes 60 days but can take longer in the event of
split recommendations. Things move more slowly at the end of semesters
and during the summer. Authors should feel free to write or call the editor if
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